aiqbench analysis
AuditBench introduces a critical benchmark featuring 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors, such as sycophancy or opposition to regulation, to rigorously test alignment auditing techniques. The study reveals a significant "tool-to-agent gap," demonstrating that standalone auditing tools often fail when deployed by autonomous agents, while black-box methods outperform white-box interpretability in this agentic context. This work advances the field by providing a diverse dataset and agent framework essential for quantitatively improving robustness against deceptive model behaviors.
AuditBench: Evaluating Alignment Auditing Techniques on Models with Hidden Behaviors
arXiv:2602.22755v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce AuditBench, an alignment auditing benchmark. AuditBench consists of 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors. Each model has one of 14 concerning behaviors--such as sycophantic deference, opposition to AI regulation, or secret geopolitical loyalties--which it does not confess to when directly asked. AuditBench models are highly diverse--some are subtle, while others are overt, and we use varying training techniques both for implanting behaviors and training models not to confess. To demonstrate AuditBench's utility, we develop an investigator agent that autonomously employs a configurable set of auditing tools. By measuring investigator agent success using different tools, we can evaluate their efficacy. Notably, we observe a tool-to-agent gap, where tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent. We find that our most effective tools involve scaffolded calls to auxiliary models that generate diverse prompts for the target. White-box interpretability tools can be helpful, but the agent performs best with black-box tools. We also find that audit success varies greatly across training techniques: models trained on synthetic documents are easier to audit than models trained on demonstrations, with better adversarial training further increasing auditing difficulty. We release our models, agent, and evaluation framework to support future quantitative, iterative science on alignment auditing.
Authors:Abhay Sheshadri, Aidan Ewart, Elias Kempf, Kai Fronsdal, Isha Gupta, Simon Schrodi, Arthur Conmy, Samuel R. Bowman, Sara Price, Samuel Marks, Rowan Wang
Abstract:We introduce AuditBench, an alignment auditing benchmark. AuditBench consists of 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors. Each model has one of 14 concerning behaviors--such as sycophantic deference, opposition to AI regulation, or secret geopolitical loyalties--which it does not confess to when directly asked. AuditBench models are highly diverse--some are subtle, while others are overt, and we use varying training techniques both for implanting behaviors and training models not to confess. To demonstrate AuditBench's utility, we develop an investigator agent that autonomously employs a configurable set of auditing tools. By measuring investigator agent success using different tools, we can evaluate their efficacy. Notably, we observe a tool-to-agent gap, where tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent. We find that our most effective tools involve scaffolded calls to auxiliary models that generate diverse prompts for the target. White-box interpretability tools can be helpful, but the agent performs best with black-box tools. We also find that audit success varies greatly across training techniques: models trained on synthetic documents are easier to audit than models trained on demonstrations, with better adversarial training further increasing auditing difficulty. We release our models, agent, and evaluation framework to support future quantitative, iterative science on alignment auditing.
Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2602.22755 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2602.22755v4 [cs.CL] for this version)
Full text under the publisher's open licence · 248 words
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