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This paper introduces a "Retention Layer" that equips Transformers with persistent memory by framing knowledge acquisition as a social learning problem involving credibility and quorum-based consensus. The authors demonstrate through simulation that this architecture significantly improves resilience against memory-poisoning attacks and world drift compared to standard base models. By deriving the memory lifecycle from principles like surprise gating and adversarial evidence thresholds, the work addresses critical challenges in deploying reliable, long-running AI assistants.
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Attention is All You Need Until You Need Retention

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2501.09166v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Pretrained Transformers keep what they learned in their weights and lose what they observe once a session ends. The first version of this paper proposed a Retention Layer, a persistent memory that a Transformer block reads with attention and writes during use. Because most of what a deployed model could retain is produced by other agents, this revision treats deciding what to keep as a social learning problem: when to rely on observed behaviour, whom to learn from and how much independent agreement to require. We give a corrected specification of the layer, which reduces exactly to the base Transformer when its memory is empty. We derive the memory's lifecycle from social learning strategies: encoding gated by surprise, observed outcomes and earned credibility; consolidation by a credibility weighted quorum of distinct, recent sources that must also outweigh every rival behaviour; and reconsolidation by the outcomes of reproduction. We prove that raising the quorum lowers the risk of consolidating a coordinated false template exponentially while delaying true templates only linearly, and that relative consolidation protects only while credible honest evidence arrives faster than adversarial evidence. In a simulation with world drift and three memory-poisoning attacks, the lifecycle reached accuracies of 0.989 to 0.996, against 0.62 to 0.63 for the ungated first version design, and kept attack success at or below 0.07 when 30% of the observations about a target were adversarial. As predicted, it amplified attacks once adversarial evidence outpaced honest evidence. Experience with a long running assistant adds two rules: a model's own outputs must not count as support, and a user's testimony should be kept after one mention. We close with an evaluation protocol for language models.

Abstract:Pretrained Transformers keep what they learned in their weights and lose what they observe once a session ends. The first version of this paper proposed a Retention Layer, a persistent memory that a Transformer block reads with attention and writes during use. Because most of what a deployed model could retain is produced by other agents, this revision treats deciding what to keep as a social learning problem: when to rely on observed behaviour, whom to learn from and how much independent agreement to require. We give a corrected specification of the layer, which reduces exactly to the base Transformer when its memory is empty. We derive the memory's lifecycle from social learning strategies: encoding gated by surprise, observed outcomes and earned credibility; consolidation by a credibility weighted quorum of distinct, recent sources that must also outweigh every rival behaviour; and reconsolidation by the outcomes of reproduction. We prove that raising the quorum lowers the risk of consolidating a coordinated false template exponentially while delaying true templates only linearly, and that relative consolidation protects only while credible honest evidence arrives faster than adversarial evidence. In a simulation with world drift and three memory-poisoning attacks, the lifecycle reached accuracies of 0.989 to 0.996, against 0.62 to 0.63 for the ungated first version design, and kept attack success at or below 0.07 when 30% of the observations about a target were adversarial. As predicted, it amplified attacks once adversarial evidence outpaced honest evidence. Experience with a long running assistant adds two rules: a model's own outputs must not count as support, and a user's testimony should be kept after one mention. We close with an evaluation protocol for language models.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2501.09166 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2501.09166v2 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2501.09166 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 373 words

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