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This research introduces Aspiration-based Perturbed Learning Automata (APLA), a novel reinforcement scheme designed to address convergence failures in distributed multi-player games with noisy observations. By incorporating an aspiration factor that reflects player satisfaction, the study establishes stochastic stability for generic non-zero-sum games where standard methods often fail to reach pure Nash equilibria. The work advances theoretical foundations for robust optimization in complex, decentralized environments by mapping infinite-dimensional Markov chains to finite equivalents.
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Aspiration-based Perturbed Learning Automata in Games with Noisy Utility Measurements. Part A: Stochastic Stability in Non-zero-Sum Games

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2511.11602v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reinforcement-based learning has attracted considerable attention both in modeling human behavior as well as in engineering, for designing measurement- or payoff-based optimization schemes. Such learning schemes exhibit several advantages, especially in relation to filtering out noisy observations. However, they may exhibit several limitations when applied in a distributed setup. In multi-player weakly-acyclic games, and when each player applies an independent copy of the learning dynamics, convergence to (usually desirable) pure Nash equilibria cannot be guaranteed. Prior work has only focused on a small class of games, namely potential and coordination games. To address this main limitation, this paper introduces a novel payoff-based learning scheme for distributed optimization, namely aspiration-based perturbed learning automata (APLA). In this class of dynamics, and contrary to standard reinforcement-based learning schemes, each player's probability distribution for selecting actions is reinforced both by repeated selection and an aspiration factor that captures the player's satisfaction level. We provide a stochastic stability analysis of APLA in multi-player positive-utility games under the presence of noisy observations. This is the first part of the paper that characterizes stochastic stability in generic non-zero-sum games by establishing equivalence of the induced infinite-dimensional Markov chain with a finite dimensional one. In the second part, stochastic stability is further specialized to weakly acyclic games.

Title:Aspiration-based Perturbed Learning Automata in Games with Noisy Utility Measurements. Part A: Stochastic Stability in Non-zero-Sum Games

Abstract:Reinforcement-based learning has attracted considerable attention both in modeling human behavior as well as in engineering, for designing measurement- or payoff-based optimization schemes. Such learning schemes exhibit several advantages, especially in relation to filtering out noisy observations. However, they may exhibit several limitations when applied in a distributed setup. In multi-player weakly-acyclic games, and when each player applies an independent copy of the learning dynamics, convergence to (usually desirable) pure Nash equilibria cannot be guaranteed. Prior work has only focused on a small class of games, namely potential and coordination games. To address this main limitation, this paper introduces a novel payoff-based learning scheme for distributed optimization, namely aspiration-based perturbed learning automata (APLA). In this class of dynamics, and contrary to standard reinforcement-based learning schemes, each player's probability distribution for selecting actions is reinforced both by repeated selection and an aspiration factor that captures the player's satisfaction level. We provide a stochastic stability analysis of APLA in multi-player positive-utility games under the presence of noisy observations. This is the first part of the paper that characterizes stochastic stability in generic non-zero-sum games by establishing equivalence of the induced infinite-dimensional Markov chain with a finite dimensional one. In the second part, stochastic stability is further specialized to weakly acyclic games.

The content of this paper will be incorporated into another paper, already available under another arXiv-ID: https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.18418

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Optimization and Control (math.OC)

arXiv:2511.11602 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2511.11602v3 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2511.11602 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 348 words

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