aiqbench analysis
ArrivalBench exposes a critical reliability gap in agentic workflows by demonstrating that pipelines passing single-snapshot tests frequently fail under realistic replay conditions involving out-of-order or duplicated records. The study reveals that idempotency hazards are the primary source of silent data corruption, distinguishing them from observable crashes and highlighting the need for robust verification beyond initial execution. This research underscores that current evaluation metrics significantly overestimate the stability of agent-generated data pipelines in production environments.
ArrivalBench: Agent-Generated Data Pipelines Are Correct Once and Wrong Under Time
arXiv:2610.02363v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmarks for agent-generated data work grade a pipeline by running it once against a fixed snapshot. ArrivalBench instead re-executes the pipeline an agent leaves behind under adversarial but replayable delivery schedules (late, duplicated, out-of-order and retried records) and requires its final state to equal a batch recomputation of the complete log. Because the oracle recomputes rather than classifies, a wrong table and a crash are distinct verdicts: a crash is visible to monitoring a team already runs, and a wrong table is not. On 40 tasks we built, our reimplementation of single-execution grading certifies 86-100% of the pipelines eleven models produce; re-executing the same artifacts finds 7.0-79.2% of the certified ones silently wrong. The gap is not produced by the repair loop: within the same model and task, pipelines repaired against the snapshot test fail replay about as often as those that passed it first time. In every model, idempotency hazards fail more often than ordering hazards. Separating a wrong answer from a crash also changes how interventions read: a hazard warning cuts one model's silent failure from 48.2% to 10.5% while raising its crash rate from 9.0% to 37.0%, so all-in failure moves only from 51.0% to 44.0%. All eleven arms were independently re-run, and rates moved by at most 5.9 points.
Abstract:Benchmarks for agent-generated data work grade a pipeline by running it once against a fixed snapshot. ArrivalBench instead re-executes the pipeline an agent leaves behind under adversarial but replayable delivery schedules (late, duplicated, out-of-order and retried records) and requires its final state to equal a batch recomputation of the complete log. Because the oracle recomputes rather than classifies, a wrong table and a crash are distinct verdicts: a crash is visible to monitoring a team already runs, and a wrong table is not. On 40 tasks we built, our reimplementation of single-execution grading certifies 86-100% of the pipelines eleven models produce; re-executing the same artifacts finds 7.0-79.2% of the certified ones silently wrong. The gap is not produced by the repair loop: within the same model and task, pipelines repaired against the snapshot test fail replay about as often as those that passed it first time. In every model, idempotency hazards fail more often than ordering hazards. Separating a wrong answer from a crash also changes how interventions read: a hazard warning cuts one model's silent failure from 48.2% to 10.5% while raising its crash rate from 9.0% to 37.0%, so all-in failure moves only from 51.0% to 44.0%. All eleven arms were independently re-run, and rates moved by at most 5.9 points.
Accepted as a poster at the NeurIPS 2026 Workshop "Who Verifies the Agents?". 20 pages
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Databases (cs.DB)
arXiv:2610.02363 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2610.02363v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.02363 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 324 words
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