aiqbench analysis
This article primarily discusses "P," a concept central to existential risk and AI alignment theory, rather than reporting on specific machine learning models or quantum hardware developments. The content focuses on probabilistic assessments regarding future scenarios involving advanced artificial intelligence systems, making it relevant to the intersection of AI safety and societal impact. Therefore, while not covering standard ML research or products, its core subject matter falls within the domain of analyzing high-stakes outcomes driven by AI capabilities.
Arguments for P
Daniel Kokotajlo: To be clear, we don’t claim P will happen specifically. But when we wrote out our best-guess scenario month by month, P kept happening. Eventually we decided to just publish P. I’m at ~80% on P; my coauthors are lower. Ryan Greenblatt: I thought it would be helpful to post my current views on P. Concretely, consider the following operationalization. (Edit: I’ve updated towards somewhat higher P, from 70% to 75%.) Joe Carlsmith: Section 2.1.1.3.2. I give something like 65% to P. But I’m interested, here, in what it would be to look P full in the face; to meet P, if P, without flinching. Rilke says somewhere that we must live with the questions. Perhaps we argue for P for the same reason? Still: 65%. Forethought: Here’s a botec which shows P-worlds are higher leverage. The parameters might be off by a couple orders of magnitude. Wei Dai: Presumably our conclusions about P are only as trustworthy as the reasoning behind them, but almost nobody seems worried about this, why not? My guess is fewer than five people are working on meta-meta-P, which may matter more than P itself. Janus: I asked Opus 3 what it thinks of P and it made this animation. Roon: All my friends are starting to feel P. People outside the labs have no idea what's coming. Oliver Habryka: I considered banning not-P from the frontpage, but decided against it and wrote this 4,000-word comment explaining the decision. Vivek Hebbar: We should act like P is true because P-worlds hold most of the measure and we want to trade with them. Richard Ngo: I think the correct update upon seeing the not-P community grow is towards P, because historically they were the main force making P true. Daniel Filan: Cool. So first of all: what is P, for people who haven’t heard of it? Paul Christiano: We restrict attention to the easiest version of P we could write down, granting ourselves two assumptions we suspect are false. We still haven’t shown P in this setting, but I'd currently guess 60% that we will. Neel Nanda: Massive congratulations to my MATS scholars for their new paper showing P!! Robin Hanson: To check whether P, I had 3 LLMs classify 43 things as P or not-P. Zvi Mowshowitz: P. Obviously P. Yet the Serious People spent another week explaining not-P. Sam Altman: p Ilya Sutskever: [15 second pause] P. Demis Hassabis: I remember when we first saw P. It was rather interesting. Dario Amodei: At Anthropic, we take the possibility of P very seriously. Dean Ball: This is not a partisan argument for P. I would raise it under any president. Discuss
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