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This research identifies a critical divergence between aligning AI models with human preferences and actually replicating human behavior, revealing that stronger preference weighting can paradoxically make models less human-like. The study empirically demonstrates that the "Turing-test gap" exists under standard alignment techniques like DPO, establishing human-likeness as a distinct dimension of alignment rather than an automatic byproduct. These findings are essential for researchers aiming to understand the fundamental limits and unintended consequences of current preference optimization methods.
Are Human-Aligned Models Models of Humans? A Turing-Test Gap in Preference Alignment
arXiv:2609.23640v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Human-feedback alignment has made language models useful assistants and is commonly described as aligning them with humans. However, the responses people prefer from an AI need not be the responses they themselves would give. We distinguish alignment with human preferences from alignment with human behavior, and show that alignment with human preferences can make model behavior less human-like even when both preferences and responses come entirely from humans. We call this the Turing-test gap. We show that preference alignment preserves the human response distribution only under a restrictive condition, and find no consistent evidence that real human preferences satisfy it. Empirically, the loss of human-response likelihood increases with the strength of preference weighting, regardless of its direction, and the gap also appears under standard DPO. These results establish human-likeness as an explicit dimension of alignment rather than something assumed to follow from preference alignment.
Title:Are Human-Aligned Models Models of Humans? A Turing-Test Gap in Preference Alignment
Abstract:Human-feedback alignment has made language models useful assistants and is commonly described as aligning them with humans. However, the responses people prefer from an AI need not be the responses they themselves would give. We distinguish alignment with human preferences from alignment with human behavior, and show that alignment with human preferences can make model behavior less human-like even when both preferences and responses come entirely from humans. We call this the Turing-test gap. We show that preference alignment preserves the human response distribution only under a restrictive condition, and find no consistent evidence that real human preferences satisfy it. Empirically, the loss of human-response likelihood increases with the strength of preference weighting, regardless of its direction, and the gap also appears under standard DPO. These results establish human-likeness as an explicit dimension of alignment rather than something assumed to follow from preference alignment.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2609.23640 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2609.23640v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.23640 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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