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ARB4WM establishes a critical benchmark for evaluating the adversarial robustness of world models in robotic control systems, addressing gaps where existing tests focus only on action-space outputs. The study reveals that attacks targeting internal components like value estimation and latent dynamics are as damaging to system reliability as direct policy disruptions, highlighting vulnerabilities in current defense strategies against visual perturbations.
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ARB4WM: An Adversarial Robustness Benchmark for World Models in Continuous Control

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2606.16605v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: World models are widely used in robotic and agentic engineering control systems due to their ability to learn latent dynamics for planning and decision-making. As these systems are increasingly deployed in safety-critical settings, understanding their robustness under adversarial conditions has become essential. However, existing evaluations lack a unified benchmark for testing adversarial threats across the policy, value, and latent-dynamics levels of world-model agents. To fill this gap, we present ARB4WM, a unified evaluation framework for pre-deployment robustness and risk assessment of world-model agents under visual perturbations. ARB4WM defines five white-box loss objectives across these three levels and studies their effects when combined with single-step or multi-step perturbation strategies and temporal attack modes, including full-frame, half-sequence, and sparse-frame exposure. Specifically, we evaluate four Dreamer-style agents across 20 tasks from MetaWorld and the DeepMind Control Suite under different loss objectives, perturbation strategies, and temporal attack modes. Results show that attacks targeting value estimation, latent representations, and RSSM dynamics can be as damaging as direct policy disruption, and that early or frequent perturbations are especially harmful, while input-level defenses provide limited recovery under adaptive attacks. These findings suggest that safety, risk, and reliability assessment for world models should cover multiple component-oriented attack objectives and temporal exposure protocols rather than relying solely on action-space robustness. Source code is available at https://github.com/zaoanguai/ARB4WM.

Abstract:World models are widely used in robotic and agentic engineering control systems due to their ability to learn latent dynamics for planning and decision-making. As these systems are increasingly deployed in safety-critical settings, understanding their robustness under adversarial conditions has become essential. However, existing evaluations lack a unified benchmark for testing adversarial threats across the policy, value, and latent-dynamics levels of world-model agents. To fill this gap, we present ARB4WM, a unified evaluation framework for pre-deployment robustness and risk assessment of world-model agents under visual perturbations. ARB4WM defines five white-box loss objectives across these three levels and studies their effects when combined with single-step or multi-step perturbation strategies and temporal attack modes, including full-frame, half-sequence, and sparse-frame exposure. Specifically, we evaluate four Dreamer-style agents across 20 tasks from MetaWorld and the DeepMind Control Suite under different loss objectives, perturbation strategies, and temporal attack modes. Results show that attacks targeting value estimation, latent representations, and RSSM dynamics can be as damaging as direct policy disruption, and that early or frequent perturbations are especially harmful, while input-level defenses provide limited recovery under adaptive attacks. These findings suggest that safety, risk, and reliability assessment for world models should cover multiple component-oriented attack objectives and temporal exposure protocols rather than relying solely on action-space robustness. Source code is available at this https URL.

24 pages, 10 figures, 5 tables. Source code available at this https URL

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2606.16605 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2606.16605v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.16605 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 326 words

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