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The paper proposes an attacker-defender reinforcement learning setup to harden LLM agents against malicious content hidden in queries, tool descriptions, or environment observations. Its main claim is improved adversarial robustness without a loss in general capability, but that rests on the authors' own benchmarks, so independent replication matters. For readers building tool-using agents, the useful signal is that co-evolved adversarial training is being extended beyond language-level safety to multi-turn tool use.
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What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

AgentSafeEvo: Adversarial Co-Evolution for LLM Agent Safety

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2610.19422v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents accomplish complex tasks through multi-turn interactions with external tools. However, malicious content embedded in user queries, tool descriptions, or environment observations can manipulate their decisions and induce unsafe actions. Adversarial co-evolution has emerged as an effective approach to strengthening LLM safety, but existing work primarily focuses on language-level safety or indirect prompt injection in web tasks. In this paper, we introduce AgentSafeEvo, a co-evolutionary reinforcement learning framework for agent safety built on an attacker-defender game spanning diverse tasks and attack types. The attacker learns to construct adversarial agent tasks that expose weaknesses in the defender's tool use, while the defender learns to complete tasks safely under these attacks. We further introduce learnability-guided task weighting, which uses within-task defender-reward variability to adjust each task's contribution to attacker and defender updates. Extensive experiments on agent safety and general capability benchmarks demonstrate that our method improves adversarial robustness while maintaining general agent capabilities.

Abstract:Large language model (LLM) agents accomplish complex tasks through multi-turn interactions with external tools. However, malicious content embedded in user queries, tool descriptions, or environment observations can manipulate their decisions and induce unsafe actions. Adversarial co-evolution has emerged as an effective approach to strengthening LLM safety, but existing work primarily focuses on language-level safety or indirect prompt injection in web tasks. In this paper, we introduce AgentSafeEvo, a co-evolutionary reinforcement learning framework for agent safety built on an attacker-defender game spanning diverse tasks and attack types. The attacker learns to construct adversarial agent tasks that expose weaknesses in the defender's tool use, while the defender learns to complete tasks safely under these attacks. We further introduce learnability-guided task weighting, which uses within-task defender-reward variability to adjust each task's contribution to attacker and defender updates. Extensive experiments on agent safety and general capability benchmarks demonstrate that our method improves adversarial robustness while maintaining general agent capabilities.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2610.19422 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2610.19422v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.19422 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 249 words

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