aiqbench analysis
Agentao addresses critical security and governance challenges in local LLM agent deployments by architecturally separating model-generated action proposals from host-authorized execution. This framework introduces explicit runtime abstractions for permissions, state management, and protocol boundaries to mitigate risks like prompt injection and tool poisoning without relying on formal safety guarantees. The system is designed specifically for inspectable environments where agents modify persistent memory or interact with external tools under strict control protocols.
Agentao: A Governed Local-First Runtime for Tool-Using LLM Agents
arXiv:2608.13574v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly operate as execution systems that invoke tools, modify local state, use persistent memory, and interact with external protocols. These capabilities make agents useful, but they also introduce risks related to over-privileged actions, weak auditability, prompt injection, tool poisoning, and uncontrolled side effects. This paper presents Agentao, a governed local-first runtime for tool-using LLM agents. Agentao separates model-generated action proposals from host-authorized execution through a layered architecture consisting of host-facing surfaces, a host contract, a runtime core, a permission-mediated tool system, and supporting subsystems for memory, replay, plugins, skills, sub-agents, and protocol integration. We describe the motivation, threat model, design goals, governance model, execution pipeline, and structured event interface of the system. Agentao does not provide formal safety guarantees; rather, it demonstrates how permissions, state, protocol boundaries, and execution traces can be made explicit runtime abstractions for building agents that are more governable, inspectable, and suitable for host-controlled local environments. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/jin-bo/agentao.
Abstract:LLM agents increasingly operate as execution systems that invoke tools, modify local state, use persistent memory, and interact with external protocols. These capabilities make agents useful, but they also introduce risks related to over-privileged actions, weak auditability, prompt injection, tool poisoning, and uncontrolled side effects. This paper presents Agentao, a governed local-first runtime for tool-using LLM agents. Agentao separates model-generated action proposals from host-authorized execution through a layered architecture consisting of host-facing surfaces, a host contract, a runtime core, a permission-mediated tool system, and supporting subsystems for memory, replay, plugins, skills, sub-agents, and protocol integration. We describe the motivation, threat model, design goals, governance model, execution pipeline, and structured event interface of the system. Agentao does not provide formal safety guarantees; rather, it demonstrates how permissions, state, protocol boundaries, and execution traces can be made explicit runtime abstractions for building agents that are more governable, inspectable, and suitable for host-controlled local environments. The code is publicly available at this https URL.
The code is publicly available at Github. We are conducting testing and analysis of this framework, and will provide experimental results and examples in future versions
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
arXiv:2608.13574 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2608.13574v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
Full text under the publisher's open licence · 201 words
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