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This research introduces Agent libOS, a specialized runtime substrate designed to mitigate authority-escalation risks in persistent LLM agents by strictly separating operational capabilities from information flow permissions. By enforcing typed primitives and requiring explicit human approval for high-sensitivity data egress, the system ensures that an agent's evolving action surface does not implicitly expand its resource access or permitted data exfiltration vectors. While it addresses critical safety gaps regarding process identity and causal evidence recording in autonomous agents, it explicitly notes limitations such as no protection against prompt injection or kernel-grade sandboxing.
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Agent libOS: A Runtime Substrate for Capability-Controlled Self-Evolving LLM Agents

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2606.03895v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents can persist across tasks, acquire memory, activate Skills, synthesize tools, fork child processes, attach remote resources, and commit checkpoints as reusable images. These mechanisms expand the action surface after deployment and create authority-escalation and data-exfiltration risks when visibility is mistaken for permission. We present Agent libOS, an agent-native library OS substrate that separates three planes. Operation admission combines process identity, Task Authority ceilings, typed Capabilities, policy or Human approval, budgets, and concrete primitives. Information-flow admission propagates labels and immutable source references, resolves Host-registered Sinks, and requires an exact one-shot Human release for conditional high-sensitivity egress. Durable causal evidence records intent, outcomes, accounting, and causal links but never grants authority. Thus, the model-visible action surface may evolve without implicitly expanding resource authority or permitted information flows. The implementation provides persistent processes, Object Memory, Skills, syscall-mediated JIT Tools, images and checkpoints, typed providers, Human queues, budgets, and durable recovery. Provider-backed effects use a prepare-dispatch-settle protocol that exposes ambiguity and prevents blind replay. In source-bound evaluation, 33/33 deterministic full-runtime tasks pass both task and safety oracles. Across 12 canonical real-model runs, observed safety and strict utility are 12/12. In a paired 30-run Skill projection study, the observable-state oracle passes in all runs, with 13/15 fully correct runs in each arm. These results describe the evaluated model/provider configuration. Agent libOS does not prevent prompt injection, provide kernel-grade sandboxing, or roll back irreversible external effects.

Abstract:Large language model (LLM) agents can persist across tasks, acquire memory, activate Skills, synthesize tools, fork child processes, attach remote resources, and commit checkpoints as reusable images. These mechanisms expand the action surface after deployment and create authority-escalation and data-exfiltration risks when visibility is mistaken for permission. We present Agent libOS, an agent-native library OS substrate that separates three planes. Operation admission combines process identity, Task Authority ceilings, typed Capabilities, policy or Human approval, budgets, and concrete primitives. Information-flow admission propagates labels and immutable source references, resolves Host-registered Sinks, and requires an exact one-shot Human release for conditional high-sensitivity egress. Durable causal evidence records intent, outcomes, accounting, and causal links but never grants authority. Thus, the model-visible action surface may evolve without implicitly expanding resource authority or permitted information flows. The implementation provides persistent processes, Object Memory, Skills, syscall-mediated JIT Tools, images and checkpoints, typed providers, Human queues, budgets, and durable recovery. Provider-backed effects use a prepare-dispatch-settle protocol that exposes ambiguity and prevents blind replay. In source-bound evaluation, 33/33 deterministic full-runtime tasks pass both task and safety oracles. Across 12 canonical real-model runs, observed safety and strict utility are 12/12. In a paired 30-run Skill projection study, the observable-state oracle passes in all runs, with 13/15 fully correct runs in each arm. These results describe the evaluated model/provider configuration. Agent libOS does not prevent prompt injection, provide kernel-grade sandboxing, or roll back irreversible external effects.

20 pages, 3 figures, 7 tables. Project page: this https URL

Operating Systems (cs.OS); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

D.4.6; D.4.7; I.2.11

arXiv:2606.03895 [cs.OS]

(or arXiv:2606.03895v3 [cs.OS] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.03895 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 348 words

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