aiqbench analysis
This research tackles the vulnerability of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) systems to corpus knowledge poisoning attacks by introducing Sparse Document Attention RAG (SDAG). The proposed method utilizes a block-sparse attention mechanism to prevent harmful cross-document interactions, significantly outperforming standard causal attention and existing defense strategies. By isolating retrieved documents during inference, this approach offers a robust architectural solution for securing LLM-based question answering against adversarial document injection.
Addressing Corpus Knowledge Poisoning Attacks on RAG Using Sparse Attention
arXiv:2602.04711v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) is a highly effective paradigm for keeping LLM-based responses up-to-date and reducing the likelihood of hallucinations. Yet, RAG was recently shown to be quite vulnerable to corpus knowledge poisoning: an attacker injects misleading documents to the corpus to steer an LLM's output to an undesired response. We argue that the standard causal attention mechanism in LLMs enables harmful cross-document interactions, specifically in cases of attacks. Accordingly, we introduce a novel defense approach for RAG: Sparse Document Attention RAG (SDAG). This is a block-sparse attention mechanism that disallows cross-attention between retrieved documents. SDAG requires a minimal inference-time change to the attention mask. We present an empirical evaluation of LLM-based question answering (QA) with a variety of attack strategies on RAG. We show that our SDAG method substantially outperforms the standard causal attention mechanism. We further demonstrate the clear merits of integrating SDAG with state-of-the-art RAG defense methods. Specifically, the integration results in performance that is statistically significantly better than the state-of-the-art.
Abstract:Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) is a highly effective paradigm for keeping LLM-based responses up-to-date and reducing the likelihood of hallucinations. Yet, RAG was recently shown to be quite vulnerable to corpus knowledge poisoning: an attacker injects misleading documents to the corpus to steer an LLM's output to an undesired response. We argue that the standard causal attention mechanism in LLMs enables harmful cross-document interactions, specifically in cases of attacks. Accordingly, we introduce a novel defense approach for RAG: Sparse Document Attention RAG (SDAG). This is a block-sparse attention mechanism that disallows cross-attention between retrieved documents. SDAG requires a minimal inference-time change to the attention mask. We present an empirical evaluation of LLM-based question answering (QA) with a variety of attack strategies on RAG. We show that our SDAG method substantially outperforms the standard causal attention mechanism. We further demonstrate the clear merits of integrating SDAG with state-of-the-art RAG defense methods. Specifically, the integration results in performance that is statistically significantly better than the state-of-the-art.
Information Retrieval (cs.IR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2602.04711 [cs.IR]
(or arXiv:2602.04711v3 [cs.IR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2602.04711 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 259 words
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