Actions with Receipts: Jointly Binding Claims, Evidence, and Execution for Replayable Tool-Agent Auditing

Abstract:Tool-using agents can expose citations and execution logs while leaving a critical association unaudited: whether the claim shown to a user is the claim emitted by the committed execution and supported by the cited source. A valid citation and a valid trace can therefore remain individually well formed while being transplanted across claims, actions, runs, or source versions. We introduce a claim-anchored execution contract that jointly binds the emitted claim, its exact source span, the ordered execution prefix that produced it, and the source version and access state observed by that execution. Each receipt contains an emission anchor that deterministically locates the claim inside a committed answer or claim-bearing action, together with source identifiers, offsets, hashes, quotes, and a domain-separated execution commitment. A deterministic integrity verifier reconstructs these bindings before semantic or task labels are joined. We separate this integrity plane from a pluggable support plane, so structural validity is not used as a proxy for entailment. The contract exposes seven independently testable properties: claim-emission binding, source binding, ordered-execution binding, oracle separation, persisted-object replay, execution-rerun consistency, and version/access binding. Across 1,280 cross-object attacks, the joint contract detects 1,275 substitutions (0.9961). Removing a targeted property reduces its attack-detection rate to 0.0156-0.0625. On an independently adjudicated 384-pair split, the conflict-aware support guard reaches F1 0.8865 and false acceptance 0.0729; on unseen failure families, these rates are 0.8679 and 0.0938.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2610.00327 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2610.00327v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.00327 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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