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This research exposes a critical security vulnerability in Federated Retrieval-Augmented Generation (FedRAG) where malicious actors can forge client profiles to hijack query routing and inject poisoned evidence. The study demonstrates that standard encryption and existing Byzantine-robust defenses are insufficient against this specific manipulation, leading to severe downstream failures like hallucinations and incorrect answers in high-stakes domains. To mitigate these risks, the authors propose a trust-aware post-routing framework that dynamically reweights clients based on retrieval relevance and cross-client agreement to suppress persistent attacks.
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A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Targeted Routing Hijacking in Federated RAG

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2605.28112v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Federated Retrieval-Augmented Generation (FedRAG) is attractive for privacy-sensitive applications because full local corpora remain on clients. As a result, routing must rely on client-provided semantic profiles, creating a new opportunity for manipulation. We introduce Routing Hijacking, a routing-stage attack in which a malicious client forges its profile to attract target queries despite having irrelevant underlying data. We show that this vulnerability is severe. Across three representative FedRAG routing architectures, Routing Hijacking consistently misroutes target queries and leads to downstream disruptions and failures, including missing evidence, poisoning, incorrect answers, and hallucinations. In a controlled MedQA-USMLE stress test, we further show that poisoned retrieved evidence can mislead models across scales, leading to incorrect answers, hallucinations, and sycophantic failures. Existing defenses do not close this gap: encrypted routing preserves the exploited ranking, and Byzantine-robust Federated Learning (FL) rules transfer poorly to heterogeneous routing profiles. To address this gap, we propose a trust-aware post-routing framework that reweights clients using returned-evidence feedback, including retrieval relevance, profile consistency, and cross-client agreement; online experiments show that it suppresses persistent hijacking over recurring queries and transfers to a learned neural router. Our findings establish routing integrity as a security challenge in FedRAG and highlight the need for stronger defenses for secure federated retrieval.

Abstract:Federated Retrieval-Augmented Generation (FedRAG) is attractive for privacy-sensitive applications because full local corpora remain on clients. As a result, routing must rely on client-provided semantic profiles, creating a new opportunity for manipulation. We introduce Routing Hijacking, a routing-stage attack in which a malicious client forges its profile to attract target queries despite having irrelevant underlying data. We show that this vulnerability is severe. Across three representative FedRAG routing architectures, Routing Hijacking consistently misroutes target queries and leads to downstream disruptions and failures, including missing evidence, poisoning, incorrect answers, and hallucinations. In a controlled MedQA-USMLE stress test, we further show that poisoned retrieved evidence can mislead models across scales, leading to incorrect answers, hallucinations, and sycophantic failures. Existing defenses do not close this gap: encrypted routing preserves the exploited ranking, and Byzantine-robust Federated Learning (FL) rules transfer poorly to heterogeneous routing profiles. To address this gap, we propose a trust-aware post-routing framework that reweights clients using returned-evidence feedback, including retrieval relevance, profile consistency, and cross-client agreement; online experiments show that it suppresses persistent hijacking over recurring queries and transfers to a learned neural router. Our findings establish routing integrity as a security challenge in FedRAG and highlight the need for stronger defenses for secure federated retrieval.

Accepted to the EMNLP 2026 Main Conference. Code available at this https URL

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Information Retrieval (cs.IR)

arXiv:2605.28112 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2605.28112v2 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.28112 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 318 words

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