aiqbench analysis
This survey identifies a critical security shift in LLM agents, where writable persistent memory creates unique threats of persistence, statefulness, and propagation distinct from traditional input-centric vulnerabilities. The authors propose Verifiable Memory Governance (VMG), a system-level framework requiring storage-time provenance and versioning to ensure auditable control over long-term memory states. This work establishes essential architectural primitives for securing the full lifecycle of agent memory, moving beyond retrofitting defenses at retrieval or execution phases.
A Survey on Long-Term Memory Security in LLM Agents: Attacks, Defenses, and Governance Across the Memory Lifecycle
arXiv:2604.16548v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The emergence of writable, cross-session persistent memory in LLM agents introduces a qualitatively different threat landscape from conventional input-centric security concerns, characterized by three properties: persistence, statefulness, and propagation. To systematically characterize this landscape, we propose a Memory Lifecycle Framework that organizes attacks, defenses, and their cross-phase dependencies along two axes: six lifecycle phases (Write, Store, Retrieve, Execute, Share & Propagate, Forget & Rollback) and four security objectives (Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Governance). This analysis in turn exposes the need for formal security guarantees at the system level, motivating Verifiable Memory Governance (VMG), a framework of five architectural primitives that specifies what verifiable mechanisms a long-term-memory system must provide to maintain auditable, recoverable control over its memory state. Our analysis indicates that robust Long-Term Memory (LTM) security cannot be retrofitted at retrieval or execution time alone, but must be anchored in storage-time provenance, versioning, and policy-aware retention from the outset.
Abstract:The emergence of writable, cross-session persistent memory in LLM agents introduces a qualitatively different threat landscape from conventional input-centric security concerns, characterized by three properties: persistence, statefulness, and propagation. To systematically characterize this landscape, we propose a Memory Lifecycle Framework that organizes attacks, defenses, and their cross-phase dependencies along two axes: six lifecycle phases (Write, Store, Retrieve, Execute, Share & Propagate, Forget & Rollback) and four security objectives (Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Governance). This analysis in turn exposes the need for formal security guarantees at the system level, motivating Verifiable Memory Governance (VMG), a framework of five architectural primitives that specifies what verifiable mechanisms a long-term-memory system must provide to maintain auditable, recoverable control over its memory state. Our analysis indicates that robust Long-Term Memory (LTM) security cannot be retrofitted at retrieval or execution time alone, but must be anchored in storage-time provenance, versioning, and policy-aware retention from the outset.
15 pages, 3 figures, 3 tables. Accepted to EMNLP 2026
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
K.6.5; I.2.0; D.4.6
arXiv:2604.16548 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.16548v3 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.16548 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 262 words
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