aiqbench analysis
This research delivers a breakthrough in optimization theory by providing the first polynomial-time algorithm for solving variational inequalities under the Minty condition, effectively bypassing previous exponential complexity barriers. By leveraging a novel variant of the ellipsoid algorithm, the work enables efficient computation of Nash equilibria in multi-player harmonic games and other general-sum concave scenarios without requiring restrictive assumptions like monotonicity. These advances significantly expand the tractable scope of foundational optimization problems central to machine learning and game theory applications.
A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Variational Inequalities under the Minty Condition
arXiv:2504.03432v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Solving (Stampacchia) variational inequalities (SVIs) is a foundational problem at the heart of optimization. However, this expressivity comes at the cost of computational hardness. As a result, most research has focused on carving out specific subclasses that elude those intractability barriers. A classical property that goes back to the 1960s is the Minty condition, which postulates that the Minty VI (MVI) problem admits a solution. In this paper, we establish the first polynomial-time algorithm -- with complexity growing polynomially in the dimension $d$ and $\log(1/\epsilon)$ -- for solving $\epsilon$-SVIs for Lipschitz continuous mappings under the Minty condition. Prior approaches either incurred an exponentially worse dependence on $1/\epsilon$ (and other natural parameters of the problem) or made more restrictive assumptions, such as monotonicity. To do so, we introduce a new variant of the ellipsoid algorithm whereby separating hyperplanes are obtained after taking a descent step from the center of the ellipsoid. It succeeds even though the set of SVIs can be nonconvex and not fully dimensional. Moreover, when our algorithm is applied to an instance with no MVI solution and fails to identify an SVI solution, it produces a succinct certificate of MVI infeasibility. We also show that deciding whether the Minty condition holds is $\mathsf{coNP}$-complete, thereby establishing that the disjunction of those two problems is polynomial-time solvable even though each problem is individually intractable. We provide several extensions and new applications of our main results. Most notably, we obtain the first polynomial-time algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in multi-player harmonic games. Finally, in two-player general-sum concave games, we give the first polynomial-time algorithm that outputs either a Nash equilibrium or a strict coarse correlated equilibrium.
Abstract:Solving (Stampacchia) variational inequalities (SVIs) is a foundational problem at the heart of optimization. However, this expressivity comes at the cost of computational hardness. As a result, most research has focused on carving out specific subclasses that elude those intractability barriers. A classical property that goes back to the 1960s is the Minty condition, which postulates that the Minty VI (MVI) problem admits a solution. In this paper, we establish the first polynomial-time algorithm -- with complexity growing polynomially in the dimension $d$ and $\log(1/\epsilon)$ -- for solving $\epsilon$-SVIs for Lipschitz continuous mappings under the Minty condition. Prior approaches either incurred an exponentially worse dependence on $1/\epsilon$ (and other natural parameters of the problem) or made more restrictive assumptions, such as monotonicity. To do so, we introduce a new variant of the ellipsoid algorithm whereby separating hyperplanes are obtained after taking a descent step from the center of the ellipsoid. It succeeds even though the set of SVIs can be nonconvex and not fully dimensional. Moreover, when our algorithm is applied to an instance with no MVI solution and fails to identify an SVI solution, it produces a succinct certificate of MVI infeasibility. We also show that deciding whether the Minty condition holds is $\mathsf{coNP}$-complete, thereby establishing that the disjunction of those two problems is polynomial-time solvable even though each problem is individually intractable. We provide several extensions and new applications of our main results. Most notably, we obtain the first polynomial-time algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in multi-player harmonic games. Finally, in two-player general-sum concave games, we give the first polynomial-time algorithm that outputs either a Nash equilibrium or a strict coarse correlated equilibrium.
Optimization and Control (math.OC); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2504.03432 [math.OC]
(or arXiv:2504.03432v4 [math.OC] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2504.03432 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Full text under the publisher's open licence · 377 words
Related coverage
Notes on Algorithms
LessWrong · Jun 10, 2026

Quantum Algorithms Simulate Heat to Create Stable Thermal States
Quantum Zeitgeist · Jun 15, 2026
Efficient Exact Quantum Sampling from the Sun-Wootters Distribution for Optimal Polynomial Intersection
arXiv · Jul 21, 2026
Learning Random Quantum Circuits and the Emergence of Pseudorandomness
arXiv · Oct 1, 2026