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The paper formalizes "standing," the question of who is authorized to cancel an agent's commitment, and separates two failure modes: obeying an unauthorized canceller and executing a promise that was validly released. Its results suggest that models often fail on both counts, and that explicit state tracking and a short release policy reduce errors more reliably than stating the rules alone. These are preprint findings in a controlled chat setting, so teams building multi-party assistants should check whether they transfer to their own permission structures.
Who May Release an Agent's Promise? Standing over Commitments in Multi-Party Chat
arXiv:2610.21203v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When an assistant serving a team makes a promise to Alice, who may cancel it? We call this standing: only the creditor (the person owed) or someone the creditor or operator policy authorizes may release a commitment, regardless of rank. In a controlled chat environment we vary who cancels and separate two errors: unauthorized release (obeying someone without standing) and override (executing a released promise). Across six models, smaller open ones override the creditor (Qwen3.5-9B: 69%); larger ones drop promises on a peer's direct word (Qwen3.8-27B: 89%; gpt-6.1-sol: 83%); nearly all act on a bystander's "go ahead after all". Oracles dissociate the errors: stating the rule or the creditor curbs unauthorized release but not override, which the latter even raises in three of four models; among them, only knowing whether the promise is still owed cuts override. Enabling thinking moves smaller models the way scale does. A self-kept commitment ledger stops override in four of five models; with a one-paragraph release policy it matches or beats the best oracle store, raising gpt-6-luna's strict accuracy from 49% (policy alone) to 83%. Code, prompts, outputs and labels are released.
Title:Who May Release an Agent's Promise? Standing over Commitments in Multi-Party Chat
Abstract:When an assistant serving a team makes a promise to Alice, who may cancel it? We call this standing: only the creditor (the person owed) or someone the creditor or operator policy authorizes may release a commitment, regardless of rank. In a controlled chat environment we vary who cancels and separate two errors: unauthorized release (obeying someone without standing) and override (executing a released promise). Across six models, smaller open ones override the creditor (Qwen3.5-9B: 69%); larger ones drop promises on a peer's direct word (Qwen3.8-27B: 89%; gpt-6.1-sol: 83%); nearly all act on a bystander's "go ahead after all". Oracles dissociate the errors: stating the rule or the creditor curbs unauthorized release but not override, which the latter even raises in three of four models; among them, only knowing whether the promise is still owed cuts override. Enabling thinking moves smaller models the way scale does. A self-kept commitment ledger stops override in four of five models; with a one-paragraph release policy it matches or beats the best oracle store, raising gpt-6-luna's strict accuracy from 49% (policy alone) to 83%. Code, prompts, outputs and labels are released.
21 pages, 7 figures, 13 tables. Code: this https URL
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2610.21203 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2610.21203v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.21203 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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