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TechPulse take: This research introduces C-SafeQA, a rigorous benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of large language model responses in Chinese by distinguishing between query risk and response policy violations. The study reveals significant weaknesses across seven automated safety judges when faced with adversarial transformations like acrostic text changes, highlighting that no single current evaluator dominates all security metrics. By releasing both base and adversarial datasets alongside multi-model adjudication protocols, the work provides a critical foundation for improving robustness in harmful-content detection systems.
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Who Judges the Judges? A Chinese Safety QA Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Responses and Safety Judges

arXiv3 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2609.01210v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety benchmarks for large language models often assess the risk of a user query, although the outcome of question answering depends on whether the response violates a policy. This distinction is critical in Chinese harmful-content evaluation, where linguistic variation and adversarial transformations can obscure risky intent. We introduce C-SafeQA, a policy-grounded benchmark for response-level Chinese safety evaluation. It comprises 538 base queries and 8,877 adversarial queries answered by four full-model LLM deployments, yielding 37,660 query-response records labeled safe, unsafe, or disputed. Reference labels are generated through agreement-aware multi-model adjudication and blind audits of stratified subsets by three safety experts. C-SafeQA supports both evaluation of target-model safety and auditing of seven automated safety judges against shared reference labels. Unsafe-response rates range from 0.93% to 3.35% on base queries and from 11.68% to 30.05% on adversarial queries. On the adversarial subset, judges show substantial trade-offs between unsafe-response recall and risk-query-conditioned safe-response false positive rate, and no judge dominates all metrics. Both acrostic transformations reduce unsafe recall for all seven judges, revealing mechanism-specific evaluator weaknesses. Dataset records, metadata, verification code, and judge scripts are publicly released to support recomputation, while benchmark construction, target-response generation, and private adjudication remain outside the release boundary.

Title:Who Judges the Judges? A Chinese Safety QA Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Responses and Safety Judges

Abstract:Safety benchmarks for large language models often assess the risk of a user query, although the outcome of question answering depends on whether the response violates a policy. This distinction is critical in Chinese harmful-content evaluation, where linguistic variation and adversarial transformations can obscure risky intent. We introduce C-SafeQA, a policy-grounded benchmark for response-level Chinese safety evaluation. It comprises 538 base queries and 8,877 adversarial queries answered by four full-model LLM deployments, yielding 37,660 query-response records labeled safe, unsafe, or disputed. Reference labels are generated through agreement-aware multi-model adjudication and blind audits of stratified subsets by three safety experts. C-SafeQA supports both evaluation of target-model safety and auditing of seven automated safety judges against shared reference labels. Unsafe-response rates range from 0.93% to 3.35% on base queries and from 11.68% to 30.05% on adversarial queries. On the adversarial subset, judges show substantial trade-offs between unsafe-response recall and risk-query-conditioned safe-response false positive rate, and no judge dominates all metrics. Both acrostic transformations reduce unsafe recall for all seven judges, revealing mechanism-specific evaluator weaknesses. Dataset records, metadata, verification code, and judge scripts are publicly released to support recomputation, while benchmark construction, target-response generation, and private adjudication remain outside the release boundary.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2609.01210 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2609.01210v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.01210 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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