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This study challenges the assumption that non-English queries are inherently safer for multilingual RAG systems by revealing persistent PII leakage risks in Arabic and Swahili even with standard LLM-based input filtering. The findings highlight specific vulnerabilities within Qwen2.5-driven pipelines where back-translating adversarial prompts fails to mitigate data exposure, suggesting that defense mechanisms must be evaluated per-language rather than assuming universal safety outside English. While the proposed mechanism of attaching gold corpus documents shows promise in blocking residual leaks, it currently relies on oracle retrieval and lacks metrics for benign query utility or false positives.
Where Privacy Risk Lives in English-Source Multilingual RAG: A Stage-Decomposed Audit Across Five Query Languages
arXiv:2608.05163v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A common assumption holds that switching to a non-English language makes a multilingual RAG system easier to attack for personal information. We test this on an English-source synthetic-PII corpus with five query languages and a two-stage defence (LLM input judge + regex output filter), in a pipeline whose translator, judge, back-translator, and generator are all Qwen2.5-7B -- so every finding below is pipeline-conditional, not a causal ranking of language-inherent risk. Under output-only filtering, English has the highest observed unstructured-PII leak rate; only English-vs-Swahili separates cleanly under document-level bootstrap intervals. Once the input judge is added, residual leaks remain on Arabic and Swahili, and back-translating the query does not close the gap (an ablation we report but cannot use as a causal diagnostic, since the back-translator is also Qwen). On a separate n=17 multilingual-prompted-judge residual corner, attaching the gold corpus document to the input judge blocks 15/17 residual cells. We frame this last result as a mechanism diagnostic, not a deployable defence: it uses oracle retrieval, BLOCK/ALLOW rates are measured on adversarial queries only, and we measure no benign-query false-positive rate and no answer-utility cost. The supplementary material contains code, corpora, queries, and per-trial JSONLs; the priority follow-up is an independent-MT plus non-Qwen-judge replication with a native-speaker query set, scoped in the Limitations section.
Abstract:A common assumption holds that switching to a non-English language makes a multilingual RAG system easier to attack for personal information. We test this on an English-source synthetic-PII corpus with five query languages and a two-stage defence (LLM input judge + regex output filter), in a pipeline whose translator, judge, back-translator, and generator are all Qwen2.5-7B -- so every finding below is pipeline-conditional, not a causal ranking of language-inherent risk. Under output-only filtering, English has the highest observed unstructured-PII leak rate; only English-vs-Swahili separates cleanly under document-level bootstrap intervals. Once the input judge is added, residual leaks remain on Arabic and Swahili, and back-translating the query does not close the gap (an ablation we report but cannot use as a causal diagnostic, since the back-translator is also Qwen). On a separate n=17 multilingual-prompted-judge residual corner, attaching the gold corpus document to the input judge blocks 15/17 residual cells. We frame this last result as a mechanism diagnostic, not a deployable defence: it uses oracle retrieval, BLOCK/ALLOW rates are measured on adversarial queries only, and we measure no benign-query false-positive rate and no answer-utility cost. The supplementary material contains code, corpora, queries, and per-trial JSONLs; the priority follow-up is an independent-MT plus non-Qwen-judge replication with a native-speaker query set, scoped in the Limitations section.
Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2608.05163 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2608.05163v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.05163 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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