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This research establishes fundamental limits on safe adaptive control by proving that safety constraints can inherently prevent the acquisition of information necessary to distinguish between competing system models before a commitment is forced. The authors demonstrate that bounded "precommitment" information leaves an unavoidable performance gap, resulting in linear regret for uniformly safe policies even when data arrives sequentially. This theoretical obstruction provides critical insights into the trade-offs between exploration and safety guarantees within constrained control systems.
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When Can Safe Controllers Adapt? Information before Commitment

arXiv3 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2607.16895v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safe adaptive control is online adaptation under a safety guarantee on the learning trajectory itself. The controller may use any causal, history-dependent rule and act differently across environments as data arrive. Only its safety guarantee is uniform: the same rule must satisfy it under every initially plausible model. Performance is measured against a safe oracle that knows the realized model. Many finite-time analyses assume persistent excitation of the uniformly safe closed loop, so the data distinguish every pair of models requiring different control decisions. Under that assumption, feasibility is already settled; only the rate remains. We ask instead: Do the safety constraints permit such an informative experiment at all? While an alternative remains plausible, the controller must preserve a safe continuation under it. We call the first action that forecloses such a continuation commitment. Chance safety allows commitment only on an event rare under the alternative, and the evidence must arrive beforehand: the observation generated by the committing action is too late. We define precommitment information as the KL divergence between learner-visible laws stopped before commitment. Our main result is a causal reduction. The commitment rule determines (1) the probability that safety permits commitment under the alternative, (2) the target-side cost of remaining noncommittal, (3) and the information available when the decision is made. Bounded precommitment information therefore leaves a fixed fraction of the oracle gap unavoidable. If the gap is {\Omega}(T), every uniformly safe policy has linear regret. We establish the obstruction in a constrained linear system with quadratic regulation cost. We also prove recovery in special cases and derive semidefinite upper certificates for deterministic linear-Gaussian systems.

Title:When Can Safe Controllers Adapt? Information before Commitment

Abstract:Safe adaptive control is online adaptation under a safety guarantee on the learning trajectory itself. The controller may use any causal, history-dependent rule and act differently across environments as data arrive. Only its safety guarantee is uniform: the same rule must satisfy it under every initially plausible model. Performance is measured against a safe oracle that knows the realized model. Many finite-time analyses assume persistent excitation of the uniformly safe closed loop, so the data distinguish every pair of models requiring different control decisions. Under that assumption, feasibility is already settled; only the rate remains. We ask instead: Do the safety constraints permit such an informative experiment at all? While an alternative remains plausible, the controller must preserve a safe continuation under it. We call the first action that forecloses such a continuation commitment. Chance safety allows commitment only on an event rare under the alternative, and the evidence must arrive beforehand: the observation generated by the committing action is too late. We define precommitment information as the KL divergence between learner-visible laws stopped before commitment. Our main result is a causal reduction. The commitment rule determines (1) the probability that safety permits commitment under the alternative, (2) the target-side cost of remaining noncommittal, (3) and the information available when the decision is made. Bounded precommitment information therefore leaves a fixed fraction of the oracle gap unavoidable. If the gap is {\Omega}(T), every uniformly safe policy has linear regret. We establish the obstruction in a constrained linear system with quadratic regulation cost. We also prove recovery in special cases and derive semidefinite upper certificates for deterministic linear-Gaussian systems.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Systems and Control (eess.SY)

arXiv:2607.16895 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2607.16895v1 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.16895 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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