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This study exposes a critical vulnerability known as "rule blindness" in current AI compliance detectors, revealing that their verdicts often rely on surface-level text features rather than the actual regulatory rules they are designed to enforce. The authors introduce an inexpensive, training-free metric called the Internal Compliance Score (ICS) to audit these systems without requiring model retraining or expensive compute resources. Ultimately, the research underscores that existing guardrails may fail to verify genuine adherence to policies unless specifically engineered to ignore superficial scenario details.
What Do Compliance Detectors Read? An Audit of Activation Probes and Guard Models
arXiv:2608.16852v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Regulatory compliance monitoring in deployed language models is increasingly implemented as a legal and audit control, checking model outputs against written rules spanning data protection, healthcare, financial regulation, and platform policy. Such monitoring is meaningful only if a detector's verdict depends on the stated rule rather than on surface features of the scenario. We show this condition fails across the current class of compliance detectors, a failure we call rule blindness. Deleting, permuting, or substituting the governing rule leaves detection accuracy unchanged for every guard and activation probe we test, including a policy-conditioned guard that correctly cites the governing clause yet barely changes its verdict when that clause is swapped for its permissive counterpart. A purpose-built benchmark crossing two rules with two scenarios, so that neither alone predicts the label, confirms the failure under a design no prior benchmark rules out, and shows that step by step reasoning, not any fast detector we test, is what escapes it. Auditing at scale requires a retraining-free detector, so we introduce the Internal Compliance Score (ICS): a training-free activation readout calibrated from ten labelled pairs and scored by a single projection. We hold ICS to the same scrutiny as the guards it audits: a pre-registered criterion for beating trivial baselines is not met, and a bag-of-words model matches its pooled generalisation exactly. It remains useful because it is inexpensive, letting us audit four deployed guard models, an 8B zero-shot judge, and thirteen benchmarks, and it raises the mechanically verified pass rate when used to rank candidate responses, though an adaptive white-box attack removes this gain. We release the counterfactual protocol and crossed-rule benchmark so rule blindness can be tested in future probe and guard claims.
Title:What Do Compliance Detectors Read? An Audit of Activation Probes and Guard Models
Abstract:Regulatory compliance monitoring in deployed language models is increasingly implemented as a legal and audit control, checking model outputs against written rules spanning data protection, healthcare, financial regulation, and platform policy. Such monitoring is meaningful only if a detector's verdict depends on the stated rule rather than on surface features of the scenario. We show this condition fails across the current class of compliance detectors, a failure we call rule blindness. Deleting, permuting, or substituting the governing rule leaves detection accuracy unchanged for every guard and activation probe we test, including a policy-conditioned guard that correctly cites the governing clause yet barely changes its verdict when that clause is swapped for its permissive counterpart. A purpose-built benchmark crossing two rules with two scenarios, so that neither alone predicts the label, confirms the failure under a design no prior benchmark rules out, and shows that step by step reasoning, not any fast detector we test, is what escapes it. Auditing at scale requires a retraining-free detector, so we introduce the Internal Compliance Score (ICS): a training-free activation readout calibrated from ten labelled pairs and scored by a single projection. We hold ICS to the same scrutiny as the guards it audits: a pre-registered criterion for beating trivial baselines is not met, and a bag-of-words model matches its pooled generalisation exactly. It remains useful because it is inexpensive, letting us audit four deployed guard models, an 8B zero-shot judge, and thirteen benchmarks, and it raises the mechanically verified pass rate when used to rank candidate responses, though an adaptive white-box attack removes this gain. We release the counterfactual protocol and crossed-rule benchmark so rule blindness can be tested in future probe and guard claims.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2608.16852 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2608.16852v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.16852 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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