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This paper applies an LSTM to learn per-application normal execution traces for WebAssembly, flagging deviations as possible attacks. The reported results (zero false negatives and a 0.42% false positive rate on 67 apps across ten vulnerability classes) are promising, but readers should check how the attacks were generated, since claims about detecting "previously unseen" attacks depend on that. Per-application models also raise open questions about training overhead, runtime cost in browsers, and generalization across app updates.
WADE: An LSTM-Based Anomaly Detection Engine for WebAssembly Applications
arXiv:2610.31984v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: WebAssembly (Wasm) enables near-native performance for web applications through a portable and sandboxed execution model. However, its limited runtime protection mechanisms (e.g., the lack of stack canaries and address space layout randomization (ASLR)) leave Wasm applications vulnerable to traditional attacks. We present WADE (WebAssembly Anomaly Detection Engine), a system that detects anomalous runtime behaviors in browser-executed WebAssembly applications. WADE monitors function-level execution traces collected under benign conditions and trains a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network to learn the normal execution behavior of each application. At runtime, the model flags deviations from these learned patterns as potential attacks. Unlike signature-based approaches, WADE builds application-specific behavioral models, enabling detection of both known and previously unseen attacks without per-vulnerability signatures. We evaluate WADE on a dataset of 67 WebAssembly applications spanning ten vulnerability classes, achieving zero false negatives and a 0.42% false positive rate.
Abstract:WebAssembly (Wasm) enables near-native performance for web applications through a portable and sandboxed execution model. However, its limited runtime protection mechanisms (e.g., the lack of stack canaries and address space layout randomization (ASLR)) leave Wasm applications vulnerable to traditional attacks. We present WADE (WebAssembly Anomaly Detection Engine), a system that detects anomalous runtime behaviors in browser-executed WebAssembly applications. WADE monitors function-level execution traces collected under benign conditions and trains a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network to learn the normal execution behavior of each application. At runtime, the model flags deviations from these learned patterns as potential attacks. Unlike signature-based approaches, WADE builds application-specific behavioral models, enabling detection of both known and previously unseen attacks without per-vulnerability signatures. We evaluate WADE on a dataset of 67 WebAssembly applications spanning ten vulnerability classes, achieving zero false negatives and a 0.42% false positive rate.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2610.31984 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2610.31984v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.31984 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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