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This research establishes a unified defense framework for tool-integrated LLM agents against adversarial threats like prompt injection and backdoor attacks. By combining anomaly detection for suspicious tools with Chain-of-Thought prompting, the study significantly reduces attack success rates across diverse models while maintaining task performance. These findings are critical for hardening autonomous AI systems that rely on external APIs and multi-step reasoning capabilities.
Universal Defenses for Tool-Integrated LLM Agents Against Adversarial Attacks
arXiv:2609.16098v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities across a variety of domains, particularly when integrated with external tools for multi-step task completion. However, they are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, including direct prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, memory poisoning, and backdoor attacks, which exploit the model's openness to prompt injection and tool manipulation. In this work, we explore practical and generalizable defense strategies within a unified framework across these four attack types. We introduce two universal tool-based defenses: Attacker Tool Filtering, which uses anomaly detection (e.g., Isolation Forest) to identify and remove suspicious tools, and Normal Tool Recalling, a white-box method that restores the agent's original toolset prior to planning. Additionally, we incorporate prompt-based defenses: Chain-of-Thought prompting and self-reflection techniques to enhance reasoning and task paraphrasing to mitigate attacks. Experimental results across both four open-source LLMs (Gemma2-9B, Qwen2-7B, LLaMA3-8B, and LLaMA3.1-8B) and three proprietary LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and GPT-5) show that our methods significantly reduce the Attack Success Rates (ASR), achieving 0% ASR in many settings, while preserving or even improving the original task success rate. These findings highlight the promise of simple, modular, multi-layered defenses for strengthening the security and robustness of tool-integrated LLM agents. The code is available at https://github.com/Xiaoyan-Lisa/Defenses-for-Tool-Integrated-LLM-Agents-Against-Adversarial-Attacks.
Abstract:Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities across a variety of domains, particularly when integrated with external tools for multi-step task completion. However, they are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, including direct prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, memory poisoning, and backdoor attacks, which exploit the model's openness to prompt injection and tool manipulation. In this work, we explore practical and generalizable defense strategies within a unified framework across these four attack types. We introduce two universal tool-based defenses: Attacker Tool Filtering, which uses anomaly detection (e.g., Isolation Forest) to identify and remove suspicious tools, and Normal Tool Recalling, a white-box method that restores the agent's original toolset prior to planning. Additionally, we incorporate prompt-based defenses: Chain-of-Thought prompting and self-reflection techniques to enhance reasoning and task paraphrasing to mitigate attacks. Experimental results across both four open-source LLMs (Gemma2-9B, Qwen2-7B, LLaMA3-8B, and LLaMA3.1-8B) and three proprietary LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and GPT-5) show that our methods significantly reduce the Attack Success Rates (ASR), achieving 0% ASR in many settings, while preserving or even improving the original task success rate. These findings highlight the promise of simple, modular, multi-layered defenses for strengthening the security and robustness of tool-integrated LLM agents. The code is available at this https URL.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2609.16098 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2609.16098v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.16098 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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