analiza aiqbench
This research presents UC-PSRO, a framework for training autonomous swarms to maintain mission success under severe communication degradation by combining self-play with decentralized fallback mechanisms. The study offers an honest assessment of trade-offs, noting that while dropout-based curricula significantly boost robustness against denial-of-service conditions, adding utility-conditioning and full PSRO self-play slows convergence without guaranteeing superior exploitability advantages over fixed-opponent baselines.
UC-PSRO: Utility-Conditioned Policy-Space Response Oracles with a Communication-Dropout Curriculum for Game-Theoretic Course-of-Action Generation in Adversarial Swarms
arXiv:2608.15372v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study generating game-theoretically optimized Courses of Action (COAs) for a Blue UAS swarm against an adaptive Red adversary in a communication-degraded environment, motivated by (but not derived from) a public U.S. Air Force SBIR solicitation. We propose UC-PSRO (Utility-Conditioned Policy-Space Response Oracles with a Communication-Dropout Curriculum), combining three mechanisms: (i) PSRO self-play, so Blue and Red policies train as approximate best responses to each other rather than one side against a fixed scripted opponent; (ii) FiLM conditioning of the Blue policy on a Commander's-Intent weight vector, sampled from a Dirichlet distribution during training, so one trained policy is re-steerable at execution time without retraining; and (iii) a curriculum annealing communication-graph edge dropout during training, so the swarm learns decentralized, peer-to-peer fallback instead of depending on full connectivity. We evaluate on a synthetic, unclassified stand-in for the solicitation's maritime scenario, with 5 seeds at N=25 Blue agents and a scalability sweep to N=200. We find a genuine trade-off, not a uniform win: the communication-dropout curriculum alone gives the strongest, most robust mission-completion rates of any learned method, improving counter-intuitively as denial increases (35% to 62% success as dropout rises from 0 to 0.75); adding utility-conditioning and PSRO self-play substantially slows convergence within a fixed budget, and we find no reliable exploitability advantage for self-play over a fixed-opponent policy, both statistically indistinguishable from a small, near-zero gap. We report this honestly as a convergence cost not yet offset by a demonstrated robustness benefit, rather than overstating one method as dominant, and provide a fully vectorized, open environment training at N=200 agents in single-digit milliseconds per step on a single consumer GPU.
Abstract:We study generating game-theoretically optimized Courses of Action (COAs) for a Blue UAS swarm against an adaptive Red adversary in a communication-degraded environment, motivated by (but not derived from) a public U.S. Air Force SBIR solicitation. We propose UC-PSRO (Utility-Conditioned Policy-Space Response Oracles with a Communication-Dropout Curriculum), combining three mechanisms: (i) PSRO self-play, so Blue and Red policies train as approximate best responses to each other rather than one side against a fixed scripted opponent; (ii) FiLM conditioning of the Blue policy on a Commander's-Intent weight vector, sampled from a Dirichlet distribution during training, so one trained policy is re-steerable at execution time without retraining; and (iii) a curriculum annealing communication-graph edge dropout during training, so the swarm learns decentralized, peer-to-peer fallback instead of depending on full connectivity. We evaluate on a synthetic, unclassified stand-in for the solicitation's maritime scenario, with 5 seeds at N=25 Blue agents and a scalability sweep to N=200. We find a genuine trade-off, not a uniform win: the communication-dropout curriculum alone gives the strongest, most robust mission-completion rates of any learned method, improving counter-intuitively as denial increases (35% to 62% success as dropout rises from 0 to 0.75); adding utility-conditioning and PSRO self-play substantially slows convergence within a fixed budget, and we find no reliable exploitability advantage for self-play over a fixed-opponent policy, both statistically indistinguishable from a small, near-zero gap. We report this honestly as a convergence cost not yet offset by a demonstrated robustness benefit, rather than overstating one method as dominant, and provide a fully vectorized, open environment training at N=200 agents in single-digit milliseconds per step on a single consumer GPU.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
arXiv:2608.15372 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2608.15372v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.15372 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Text integral sub licența deschisă a publicației · 367 cuvinte
Subiecte conexe

The Entangled Dimensions of Decision Theory
LessWrong · 30 iul. 2026

Forbes Asia 100 To Watch 2026
forbes.com · 24 aug. 2026
When are safe Pareto improvements individually rational?
LessWrong · 13 oct. 2026

Taboo “equilibrium”: Less confused frames for research on AI bargaining
LessWrong · 31 iul. 2026