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This research investigates whether an LLM's willingness to accept vulnerability from a user can be causally controlled via linear steering of model activations without retraining parameters. By demonstrating monotonic control over trust decisions across multiple model families, the study offers a novel method for analyzing how trust mechanisms influence safety-critical behaviors like handling harmful requests or prompt injections.
TrustMI: Causally controlling how assistants trust their users
arXiv:2610.06064v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) assistants routinely decide whether they can trust users and third parties whose competence, intentions, and integrity they cannot verify. This uncertainty matters for safety, as trusting the wrong party can lead an agent to comply with harmful requests or act on malicious instructions encountered during tool use. To study this problem, we define trust as an assistant's willingness to accept vulnerability to the actions of another party and ask whether such behavior can be causally controlled through model activations. We build 2,000 contrastive conversations spanning ability, benevolence, and integrity, where paired responses complete the same request but differ in whether the assistant trusts the user. From these pairs, we learn steering matrices while keeping the model parameters frozen and test them across six instruction-tuned models from three families, finding that steering changes trust decisions monotonically in both directions. We then ask whether this effect extends to several safety-related agent settings involving harmful requests, prompt injections, and insider threats, while using benign-task and reasoning as controls. Our findings provide evidence that trust in the user can be causally controlled along linear directions in model activations and provide a way to study how trust shapes safety-relevant behavior in language models.
Abstract:Large Language Model (LLM) assistants routinely decide whether they can trust users and third parties whose competence, intentions, and integrity they cannot verify. This uncertainty matters for safety, as trusting the wrong party can lead an agent to comply with harmful requests or act on malicious instructions encountered during tool use. To study this problem, we define trust as an assistant's willingness to accept vulnerability to the actions of another party and ask whether such behavior can be causally controlled through model activations. We build 2,000 contrastive conversations spanning ability, benevolence, and integrity, where paired responses complete the same request but differ in whether the assistant trusts the user. From these pairs, we learn steering matrices while keeping the model parameters frozen and test them across six instruction-tuned models from three families, finding that steering changes trust decisions monotonically in both directions. We then ask whether this effect extends to several safety-related agent settings involving harmful requests, prompt injections, and insider threats, while using benign-task and reasoning as controls. Our findings provide evidence that trust in the user can be causally controlled along linear directions in model activations and provide a way to study how trust shapes safety-relevant behavior in language models.
Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2610.06064 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2610.06064v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.06064 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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