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This paper introduces VERITAS, a novel protocol that enhances the security of decentralized graph learning by combining local differential privacy with a trust-but-verify mechanism to resist data poisoning attacks. By leveraging bilateral attestation asymmetry, the system effectively identifies and prunes malicious nodes while restoring utility through dual denoising, addressing a critical vulnerability in open participation environments. The approach demonstrates significant improvements in downstream learning performance across multiple benchmarks without compromising formal privacy guarantees.
Trust-But-Verify: Poisoning-Resilient Locally Private Graph Learning Protocols
arXiv:2609.07063v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Built upon local differential privacy (LDP), locally private graph learning protocols have emerged as an important paradigm for decentralized graph learning, balancing privacy protection and learning utility. Under such protocols, each user locally perturbs their node features and adjacency information before transmission, ensuring formal privacy guarantees without original data leaving the device. However, the inherently open participation nature renders these protocols critically vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject carefully crafted malicious nodes to corrupt neighborhood aggregation and degrade downstream utility. Despite the severity of this threat, effective defenses in this setting remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose VERITAS, a poisoning-resilient locally private graph learning protocol built on a trust-but-verify paradigm. By introducing a verification list encoding graded peer trust levels, VERITAS jointly privatizes node features and graph structure on the user side, while exploiting bilateral attestation asymmetry on the server side to identify and prune malicious nodes. Concretely, VERITAS comprises four synergistic stages: (1) local data perturbation, (2) attestation-driven malicious node pruning, (3) utility restoration via dual denoising, and (4) robust private graph learning. Extensive experiments on four real-world benchmark datasets across multiple LDP mechanisms and GNN architectures demonstrate that VERITAS effectively defends against data poisoning attacks and significantly improves downstream graph learning utility under rigorous privacy guarantees.
Abstract:Built upon local differential privacy (LDP), locally private graph learning protocols have emerged as an important paradigm for decentralized graph learning, balancing privacy protection and learning utility. Under such protocols, each user locally perturbs their node features and adjacency information before transmission, ensuring formal privacy guarantees without original data leaving the device. However, the inherently open participation nature renders these protocols critically vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject carefully crafted malicious nodes to corrupt neighborhood aggregation and degrade downstream utility. Despite the severity of this threat, effective defenses in this setting remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose VERITAS, a poisoning-resilient locally private graph learning protocol built on a trust-but-verify paradigm. By introducing a verification list encoding graded peer trust levels, VERITAS jointly privatizes node features and graph structure on the user side, while exploiting bilateral attestation asymmetry on the server side to identify and prune malicious nodes. Concretely, VERITAS comprises four synergistic stages: (1) local data perturbation, (2) attestation-driven malicious node pruning, (3) utility restoration via dual denoising, and (4) robust private graph learning. Extensive experiments on four real-world benchmark datasets across multiple LDP mechanisms and GNN architectures demonstrate that VERITAS effectively defends against data poisoning attacks and significantly improves downstream graph learning utility under rigorous privacy guarantees.
Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2609.07063 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2609.07063v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.07063 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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