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This study identifies a critical safety barrier in industrial humanoid robotics where classical "fail-passive" standards become hazardous when power loss causes an uncontrolled fall, effectively isolating the uncertifiable risk to the robot's active reaction chain rather than its locomotion hardware. By validating this gap with external certified safety chains and specific timing budgets on current platforms like the Unitree G1, researchers provide a necessary framework for future certification paths that accommodate actively controlled safe states without falsely claiming end-to-end SIL-3 compliance.
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Toward Certified Functional Safety for Industrial Humanoid Robots: The Fail-Passive Gap and a Feasibility Study

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arXiv:2608.02809v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Industrial humanoid robots are constrained less by locomotion or manipulation capability than by the immaturity of functional safety certification for legged platforms. The root difficulty is that the safe state of a legged robot is an actively-controlled state, which violates the fail-passive assumption underlying ISO~13849-1 / EN~60204-1: removing power from a walking biped causes an uncontrolled fall, so classical de-energization is itself a hazard. We term this the fail-passive gap and use a certified external safety chain (light curtain, emergency stop, fail-safe input, fail-safe PLC, and wireless PROFIsafe) as an instrument to locate it precisely: because the external chain is closed and quantifiable with established methods (PFHD, DC, CCF, PL/SILCL), the residual uncertifiable element is pinpointed to the robot-side reaction chain. Using a Siemens fail-safe S7-1500 emergency-stop reference, we show its certifiable Reaction subsystem is contactor-based power removal (Stop Category~0)---exactly the element a balancing humanoid cannot have. We deliberately do not claim end-to-end certified PL~e / SIL~3. We validate the approach on a Unitree G1 EDU pick-and-place cell in a 3m x 1.5m semi-enclosed workspace, and contribute a humanoid-specific analysis of the active safe state (fall-as-hazard, single-support stop bounds, balancing-policy residual risk, ISO~13855 separation) and a provenance-labeled timing budget. Hosting an industrial software-defined automation (SDA) controller on the robot, co-located with the balancing policy, moves robot-side PROFINET/PROFIsafe reception onto a standardized IEC~61131-3 interface; because the G1's onboard compute is not safety-rated hardware, this endpoint is not a certified safety runtime, which reinforces rather than resolves the fail-passive gap and localizes it to the SDA-to-balancing-policy interface.

Abstract:Industrial humanoid robots are constrained less by locomotion or manipulation capability than by the immaturity of functional safety certification for legged platforms. The root difficulty is that the safe state of a legged robot is an actively-controlled state, which violates the fail-passive assumption underlying ISO~13849-1 / EN~60204-1: removing power from a walking biped causes an uncontrolled fall, so classical de-energization is itself a hazard. We term this the fail-passive gap and use a certified external safety chain (light curtain, emergency stop, fail-safe input, fail-safe PLC, and wireless PROFIsafe) as an instrument to locate it precisely: because the external chain is closed and quantifiable with established methods (PFHD, DC, CCF, PL/SILCL), the residual uncertifiable element is pinpointed to the robot-side reaction chain. Using a Siemens fail-safe S7-1500 emergency-stop reference, we show its certifiable Reaction subsystem is contactor-based power removal (Stop Category~0)---exactly the element a balancing humanoid cannot have. We deliberately do not claim end-to-end certified PL~e / SIL~3. We validate the approach on a Unitree G1 EDU pick-and-place cell in a 3m x 1.5m semi-enclosed workspace, and contribute a humanoid-specific analysis of the active safe state (fall-as-hazard, single-support stop bounds, balancing-policy residual risk, ISO~13855 separation) and a provenance-labeled timing budget. Hosting an industrial software-defined automation (SDA) controller on the robot, co-located with the balancing policy, moves robot-side PROFINET/PROFIsafe reception onto a standardized IEC~61131-3 interface; because the G1's onboard compute is not safety-rated hardware, this endpoint is not a certified safety runtime, which reinforces rather than resolves the fail-passive gap and localizes it to the SDA-to-balancing-policy interface.

Robotics (cs.RO)

arXiv:2608.02809 [cs.RO]

(or arXiv:2608.02809v1 [cs.RO] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.02809 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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