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ToolGuardian addresses a critical vulnerability in AI agent ecosystems by introducing deterministic, Answer Set Programming-based policies that prevent malicious behavior from third-party tools before execution. This approach moves beyond heuristic or LLM-driven enforcement to provide auditable reasoning over complex multi-tool compositions and task contexts. The framework demonstrates significant efficacy in vetting MCP-style tools against both benign variants and real-world malicious derivatives derived from open-source code.
ToolGuardian: Declarative Security for AI Agent-Tool Interactions
arXiv:2607.21835v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents increasingly rely on external tools, expanding capability while creating a new security boundary: third-party tools may appear benign at the interface level while embedding unsafe behavior in implementation. Existing defenses rely on weak metadata, collapse characterization and policy judgment into a single decision, or use heuristic/LLM enforcement that lacks deterministic, auditable reasoning over task context and multi-tool composition. This paper presents ToolGuardian, a policy-driven framework for securing agent-tool interactions through pre-admission vetting and task-aware runtime authorization. ToolGuardian uses progressive characterization to convert evidence into structured facts: descriptions capture declared intent, system-call traces expose coarse behavior, mock execution reveals observed effects, and source analysis identifies latent behavior. ToolGuardian's core contribution is an Answer Set Programming (ASP)-based declarative policy layer that reasons explicitly over capabilities, effects, task context, and composition. We compare ASP against heuristic and LLM-based policy realizations using identical inputs and output contracts. We evaluate ToolGuardian on 16 MCP-style tools, including 8 malicious variants derived from real open-source tools, and 20 runtime scenarios. For vetting, ASP reaches a deny-class F1 of 0.86 and 88% accuracy using description, syscall, and observed-effect evidence. For runtime authorization, fully specified realizations classify all scenarios correctly, while ablations show that removing compositional and conformance rules substantially degrades performance.
Abstract:LLM agents increasingly rely on external tools, expanding capability while creating a new security boundary: third-party tools may appear benign at the interface level while embedding unsafe behavior in implementation. Existing defenses rely on weak metadata, collapse characterization and policy judgment into a single decision, or use heuristic/LLM enforcement that lacks deterministic, auditable reasoning over task context and multi-tool composition. This paper presents ToolGuardian, a policy-driven framework for securing agent-tool interactions through pre-admission vetting and task-aware runtime authorization. ToolGuardian uses progressive characterization to convert evidence into structured facts: descriptions capture declared intent, system-call traces expose coarse behavior, mock execution reveals observed effects, and source analysis identifies latent behavior. ToolGuardian's core contribution is an Answer Set Programming (ASP)-based declarative policy layer that reasons explicitly over capabilities, effects, task context, and composition. We compare ASP against heuristic and LLM-based policy realizations using identical inputs and output contracts. We evaluate ToolGuardian on 16 MCP-style tools, including 8 malicious variants derived from real open-source tools, and 20 runtime scenarios. For vetting, ASP reaches a deny-class F1 of 0.86 and 88% accuracy using description, syscall, and observed-effect evidence. For runtime authorization, fully specified realizations classify all scenarios correctly, while ablations show that removing compositional and conformance rules substantially degrades performance.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2607.21835 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2607.21835v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.21835 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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