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This research introduces anytime-valid leakage detection methods for ML-KEM electromagnetic traces, offering rigorous error guarantees that traditional fixed-horizon tests lack when monitoring data acquisition in real-time. By utilizing betting-based e-processes, the study demonstrates significant efficiency gains, allowing side-channel campaigns to stop early with high confidence while maintaining strict control over false-alarm rates. These findings are critical for securing post-quantum cryptographic implementations against adaptive side-channel attacks without inflating resource budgets.
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The Price of Peeking: Anytime-Valid Leakage Detection on ML-KEM EM Traces

arXiv3 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2609.33597v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Side-channel evaluators routinely inspect leakage tests while acquisition is still running, and extend or stop the campaign based on what they see. Fixed-horizon screening such as the Welch $t$-test with threshold $|t|>4.5$ gives no error guarantee for this monitored decision rule. We study anytime-valid leakage detection based on testing by betting: SKIT-type swap-pair e-processes whose false-alarm probability is controlled uniformly over time under an explicit conditional symmetry null. In matched comparisons that share the frozen witness, rows and payoff, first-crossing detection needed 1.68-2.00$\times$ the traces of a fixed-horizon randomization test at 80% detection on synthetic streams, and 1.68-2.38$\times$ on degraded recordings from an open ML-KEM electromagnetic dataset with the primary Ridge witness at $\alpha=0.05$. With the same primary witness and level, on undegraded reference and pqm4 recordings the monitored procedure stopped early: its median stopping point was 62-72 and 146-316 evaluation traces, i.e. 2-8% of a conservative 4096-trace budget. Under exact designed nulls on the recorded backgrounds, repeated-look $|t|>4.5$ screening over all 13000-20000 samples raised a false alarm in 2.7-12.9% of replicates, against 0.0-4.7% for terminal-only screening and no rejection by a sample-wise e-Bonferroni process, which in a prespecified follow-up detected natural-label associations in 4 of 4 backgrounds after 840-3288 traces. All recordings come from one device, and natural-label results are descriptive; we state the assumptions each claim requires.

Abstract:Side-channel evaluators routinely inspect leakage tests while acquisition is still running, and extend or stop the campaign based on what they see. Fixed-horizon screening such as the Welch $t$-test with threshold $|t|>4.5$ gives no error guarantee for this monitored decision rule. We study anytime-valid leakage detection based on testing by betting: SKIT-type swap-pair e-processes whose false-alarm probability is controlled uniformly over time under an explicit conditional symmetry null. In matched comparisons that share the frozen witness, rows and payoff, first-crossing detection needed 1.68-2.00$\times$ the traces of a fixed-horizon randomization test at 80% detection on synthetic streams, and 1.68-2.38$\times$ on degraded recordings from an open ML-KEM electromagnetic dataset with the primary Ridge witness at $\alpha=0.05$. With the same primary witness and level, on undegraded reference and pqm4 recordings the monitored procedure stopped early: its median stopping point was 62-72 and 146-316 evaluation traces, i.e. 2-8% of a conservative 4096-trace budget. Under exact designed nulls on the recorded backgrounds, repeated-look $|t|>4.5$ screening over all 13000-20000 samples raised a false alarm in 2.7-12.9% of replicates, against 0.0-4.7% for terminal-only screening and no rejection by a sample-wise e-Bonferroni process, which in a prespecified follow-up detected natural-label associations in 4 of 4 backgrounds after 840-3288 traces. All recordings come from one device, and natural-label results are descriptive; we state the assumptions each claim requires.

29 pages, 7 figures, 13 tables. Code and aggregate results: this https URL

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2609.33597 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2609.33597v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.33597 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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