analiza aiqbench
This paper establishes a formal mathematical boundary, the Accountability Horizon, beyond which agentic AI systems structurally violate the core assumptions of existing legal and ethical frameworks. The central finding is that once autonomy exceeds a computable threshold within a human-AI feedback loop, no governance model can simultaneously satisfy requirements for attributability, foreseeability, non-vacuity, and completeness. For practitioners, this implies a hard phase transition where traditional oversight mechanisms like transparency and audits become mathematically insufficient without fundamentally reducing system autonomy.
The Accountability Horizon: An Impossibility Theorem for Governing Human-Agent Collectives
arXiv:2604.07778v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Existing accountability frameworks for AI systems, legal, ethical, and regulatory, rest on a shared assumption: for any consequential outcome, at least one identifiable person had enough involvement and foresight to bear meaningful responsibility. This paper proves that agentic AI systems violate this assumption not as an engineering limitation but as a mathematical necessity once autonomy exceeds a computable threshold. We introduce Human-Agent Collectives, a formalisation of joint human-AI systems where agents are modelled as state-policy tuples within a shared structural causal model. Autonomy is characterised through a four-dimensional information-theoretic profile (epistemic, executive, evaluative, social); collective behaviour through interaction graphs and joint action spaces. We axiomatise legitimate accountability through four minimal properties: Attributability (responsibility requires causal contribution), Foreseeability Bound (responsibility cannot exceed predictive capacity), Non-Vacuity (at least one agent bears non-trivial responsibility), and Completeness (all responsibility must be fully allocated). Our central result, the Accountability Incompleteness Theorem, proves that for any collective whose compound autonomy exceeds the Accountability Horizon and whose interaction graph contains a human-AI feedback cycle, no framework can satisfy all four properties simultaneously. The impossibility is structural: transparency, audits, and oversight cannot resolve it without reducing autonomy. Below the threshold, legitimate frameworks exist, establishing a sharp phase transition. Experiments on 3,000 synthetic collectives confirm all predictions with zero violations. This is the first impossibility result in AI governance, establishing a formal boundary below which current paradigms remain valid and above which distributed accountability mechanisms become necessary.
Abstract:Existing accountability frameworks for AI systems, legal, ethical, and regulatory, rest on a shared assumption: for any consequential outcome, at least one identifiable person had enough involvement and foresight to bear meaningful responsibility. This paper proves that agentic AI systems violate this assumption not as an engineering limitation but as a mathematical necessity once autonomy exceeds a computable threshold. We introduce Human-Agent Collectives, a formalisation of joint human-AI systems where agents are modelled as state-policy tuples within a shared structural causal model. Autonomy is characterised through a four-dimensional information-theoretic profile (epistemic, executive, evaluative, social); collective behaviour through interaction graphs and joint action spaces. We axiomatise legitimate accountability through four minimal properties: Attributability (responsibility requires causal contribution), Foreseeability Bound (responsibility cannot exceed predictive capacity), Non-Vacuity (at least one agent bears non-trivial responsibility), and Completeness (all responsibility must be fully allocated). Our central result, the Accountability Incompleteness Theorem, proves that for any collective whose compound autonomy exceeds the Accountability Horizon and whose interaction graph contains a human-AI feedback cycle, no framework can satisfy all four properties simultaneously. The impossibility is structural: transparency, audits, and oversight cannot resolve it without reducing autonomy. Below the threshold, legitimate frameworks exist, establishing a sharp phase transition. Experiments on 3,000 synthetic collectives confirm all predictions with zero violations. This is the first impossibility result in AI governance, establishing a formal boundary below which current paradigms remain valid and above which distributed accountability mechanisms become necessary.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2604.07778 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2604.07778v2 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.07778 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Text integral sub licența deschisă a publicației · 330 cuvinte
Subiecte conexe
What does quantum parameter estimation estimate? A no-go result for true quantity values
arXiv · 23 oct. 2026
Don't Offer What Can't Be Done: Deterministic Executability Gating for LLM Skill Selection at Scale
arXiv · 5 aug. 2026

Top 10 Best Database Security & Activity Monitoring Tools in 2026 [Ranked & Scored]
Cybersecurity News · 21 oct. 2026

SearchJack Campaign Uses 23 Chrome Extensions to Hijack Searches of 758,000 Users
Cybersecurity News · 15 iun. 2026