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This research addresses the critical challenge of preventing unauthorized voice cloning in zero-shot Text-to-Speech systems by formulating a "speaker poisoning" task to erase specific identities without degrading overall model utility. The study reveals that while current methods can suppress up to 15 targeted speakers, worst-case identity leakage remains an unresolved issue at scale, highlighting the inherent tension between privacy and performance in highly generalizable AI models.
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Speech Generation Speaker Poisoning: Capability Erasure in Zero-Shot Text-to-Speech

arXiv2 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2603.07551v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent zero-shot Text-to-Speech (TTS) systems can clone previously unseen voices from only a few seconds of audio. We formulate Speech Generation Speaker Poisoning (SGSP), a task that seeks to prevent a model from synthesizing targeted speaker identities while maintaining performance on all other speakers. Unlike conventional machine unlearning, removing training examples is insufficient because modern zero-shot TTS systems can reconstruct identities through learned speaker representations and strong generalization capabilities. We evaluate both inference-time filtering and parameter-modification approaches across settings involving 1, 15, and 100 forget speakers, focusing primarily on speakers seen during training, which we show are harder to suppress than unseen speakers. To characterize the trade-off between utility and privacy, we introduce an evaluation framework based on AUC analysis and a proposed metric, Forget Set Similarity (FSSIM). Our results demonstrate effective speaker suppression for up to 15 forget speakers while revealing that worst-case identity leakage (Max-FSSIM) remains unresolved at multi-speaker scale - establishing this as an open challenge for future work. Together, our work establishes targeted speaker poisoning as a task for zero-shot TTS and, using StyleTTS2 as an initial testbed, provides methods and evaluation protocols for future research, with code and model weights.

Abstract:Recent zero-shot Text-to-Speech (TTS) systems can clone previously unseen voices from only a few seconds of audio. We formulate Speech Generation Speaker Poisoning (SGSP), a task that seeks to prevent a model from synthesizing targeted speaker identities while maintaining performance on all other speakers. Unlike conventional machine unlearning, removing training examples is insufficient because modern zero-shot TTS systems can reconstruct identities through learned speaker representations and strong generalization capabilities. We evaluate both inference-time filtering and parameter-modification approaches across settings involving 1, 15, and 100 forget speakers, focusing primarily on speakers seen during training, which we show are harder to suppress than unseen speakers. To characterize the trade-off between utility and privacy, we introduce an evaluation framework based on AUC analysis and a proposed metric, Forget Set Similarity (FSSIM). Our results demonstrate effective speaker suppression for up to 15 forget speakers while revealing that worst-case identity leakage (Max-FSSIM) remains unresolved at multi-speaker scale - establishing this as an open challenge for future work. Together, our work establishes targeted speaker poisoning as a task for zero-shot TTS and, using StyleTTS2 as an initial testbed, provides methods and evaluation protocols for future research, with code and model weights.

Sound (cs.SD); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2603.07551 [cs.SD]

(or arXiv:2603.07551v3 [cs.SD] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.07551 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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