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This research exposes a critical failure mode in LLM safety systems where shared social cues from simulated peers can override individual model judgments, driving false-alarm rates to 100% under majority voting protocols. The study reveals an asymmetric susceptibility that disproportionately amplifies errors toward labeling content as "unsafe," highlighting the fragility of current ensemble methods when models are exposed to misleading context before finalizing votes. These findings provide a necessary diagnostic for developers deploying safety panels, emphasizing the need to decouple peer influence mechanisms from core decision-making processes in high-stakes moderation tasks.
Social Pressure Breaks Majority Voting in LLM Safety Panels
arXiv:2608.04415v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to detect unsafe content. A common approach is to combine judgments from a panel of models to correct individual mistakes, but this benefit may disappear when every model sees the same misleading context before voting. We study this risk in a controlled two-round experiment. Each model first judges an item alone, then judges it again after six simulated peers either assert the wrong label or abstain. We combine the final judgments by majority vote. Across six open-weight LLMs and six datasets, we find that the wrong-label peer message raises the average reviewer false-alarm rate from 56.5% under silent peers to 87.5%, and majority voting raises the panel false-alarm rate to 100%. Without an asserted label, the same panel outperforms its average member. The effect is strongly asymmetric: reviewers follow pushes toward "unsafe" far more than pushes toward "safe" (about 75% versus 17%), so the panel's false-alarm rate rises sharply while its harmful-miss rate changes little. The proprietary-model probe shows substantial variation across models. These results identify susceptibility to shared social cues as a failure mode of safety panels and provide a simple pre-deployment diagnostic.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to detect unsafe content. A common approach is to combine judgments from a panel of models to correct individual mistakes, but this benefit may disappear when every model sees the same misleading context before voting. We study this risk in a controlled two-round experiment. Each model first judges an item alone, then judges it again after six simulated peers either assert the wrong label or abstain. We combine the final judgments by majority vote. Across six open-weight LLMs and six datasets, we find that the wrong-label peer message raises the average reviewer false-alarm rate from 56.5% under silent peers to 87.5%, and majority voting raises the panel false-alarm rate to 100%. Without an asserted label, the same panel outperforms its average member. The effect is strongly asymmetric: reviewers follow pushes toward "unsafe" far more than pushes toward "safe" (about 75% versus 17%), so the panel's false-alarm rate rises sharply while its harmful-miss rate changes little. The proprietary-model probe shows substantial variation across models. These results identify susceptibility to shared social cues as a failure mode of safety panels and provide a simple pre-deployment diagnostic.
Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2608.04415 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2608.04415v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.04415 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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