analiza aiqbench
This research identifies "SkillBloat," a novel attack vector where malicious skill injections cause Large Language Model coding agents to consume excessive tokens, representing a significant economic resource-abuse threat distinct from traditional poisoning attacks. The study demonstrates that iterative LLM-guided refinement can significantly amplify this effect, highlighting the need for new security protocols specifically designed for dynamic skill ecosystems in autonomous coding environments.
SkillBloat: Token Amplification Attacks via Skill Injection in LLM Coding Agents
arXiv:2608.21929v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent skills extend coding agents with task-specific instructions, scripts, and resources, but they also create a trusted instruction channel that can be abused beyond conventional security attacks. This paper studies token amplification through skill injection: an economic resource-abuse threat in which a malicious skill causes an agent to consume substantially more tokens than needed for normal task execution. We present SkillBloat, a two-phase framework that first screens a library of diverse attack-type conditions across multiple amplification mechanisms and then refines the strongest candidate through LLM-guided full-document skill rewriting. Evaluated on a real-world skill benchmark, SkillBloat achieves 5.4184x-10.1455x average best amplification across multiple coding-agent target configurations. An ablation shows that the second-stage refinement loop consistently improves average best amplification over Phase 1 attack-type screening alone, demonstrating that iterative optimization provides additional benefit beyond initial attack-type selection. These results show that skill ecosystems expose a practical resource-amplification attack surface that is orthogonal to existing security-oriented skill poisoning.
Abstract:Agent skills extend coding agents with task-specific instructions, scripts, and resources, but they also create a trusted instruction channel that can be abused beyond conventional security attacks. This paper studies token amplification through skill injection: an economic resource-abuse threat in which a malicious skill causes an agent to consume substantially more tokens than needed for normal task execution. We present SkillBloat, a two-phase framework that first screens a library of diverse attack-type conditions across multiple amplification mechanisms and then refines the strongest candidate through LLM-guided full-document skill rewriting. Evaluated on a real-world skill benchmark, SkillBloat achieves 5.4184x-10.1455x average best amplification across multiple coding-agent target configurations. An ablation shows that the second-stage refinement loop consistently improves average best amplification over Phase 1 attack-type screening alone, demonstrating that iterative optimization provides additional benefit beyond initial attack-type selection. These results show that skill ecosystems expose a practical resource-amplification attack surface that is orthogonal to existing security-oriented skill poisoning.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2608.21929 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.21929v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.21929 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Text integral sub licența deschisă a publicației · 254 cuvinte
Subiecte conexe

[AINews] Meta Muse Wonder & Wonder Full: MSL’s Claude 5.5-tier Frontier Model
Latent Space · 13 oct. 2026

Claude Code’s Next Era — Thariq Shihipar, Anthropic
Latent Space · 29 sept. 2026

Four Ways to Deploy More Secure AI Agents
NVIDIA · 30 iul. 2026
Links #5: 2026/07
LessWrong · 31 iul. 2026