analiza aiqbench
This research identifies critical safety vulnerabilities in Looped Language Models where jailbreak attacks become more effective at deeper inference depths and can transfer across them. The authors propose SafeBridge, a novel alignment method that enforces joint safety supervision across recurrent layers to mitigate these risks while preserving model utility. This work is essential for establishing robust security protocols as recurrent architectures evolve beyond single-step inference.
Safe at One Loop, Risky at Another: Aligning Safety Across Recurrent Depths in Looped Language Models
arXiv:2610.10625v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Looped Language Models (LoopLMs) provide a parameter efficient approach to scaling model capabilities through repeated use of shared parameters across recurrent steps. Since each recurrent depth can be read out independently, a single LoopLM exposes a broader output space across inference depths, raising an important question: whether safety is preserved throughout recurrent computation. Prior evaluations suggest that deeper recurrence can improve safety on harmful queries, but robustness under jailbreak attacks remains unclear. We therefore conduct a comprehensive safety evaluation of LoopLMs under jailbreak attacks targeting different recurrent depths. We find that attack success can increase at deeper inference depths, the same query can elicit different safety behaviors across depths, and attacks constructed against one depth can transfer to others. Moreover, SFT and preference alignment do not eliminate these safety gaps, motivating an alignment method designed for LoopLMs. We introduce SafeBridge, which combines lightweight depth specific control of shared recurrent layers, selective state bridging, and joint safety supervision across recurrent depths. Across model scales, multiple attack methods, and safety benchmarks, SafeBridge substantially reduces attack success for both matched-depth and cross-depth attacks. It also improves general utility over the vanilla models while maintaining comparable over-refusal behavior. Our results show that the safety of a LoopLM cannot be inferred from a single recurrent depth, motivating safety alignment across recurrent computation. Our code and model checkpoints will be released upon acceptance.
Abstract:Looped Language Models (LoopLMs) provide a parameter efficient approach to scaling model capabilities through repeated use of shared parameters across recurrent steps. Since each recurrent depth can be read out independently, a single LoopLM exposes a broader output space across inference depths, raising an important question: whether safety is preserved throughout recurrent computation. Prior evaluations suggest that deeper recurrence can improve safety on harmful queries, but robustness under jailbreak attacks remains unclear. We therefore conduct a comprehensive safety evaluation of LoopLMs under jailbreak attacks targeting different recurrent depths. We find that attack success can increase at deeper inference depths, the same query can elicit different safety behaviors across depths, and attacks constructed against one depth can transfer to others. Moreover, SFT and preference alignment do not eliminate these safety gaps, motivating an alignment method designed for LoopLMs. We introduce SafeBridge, which combines lightweight depth specific control of shared recurrent layers, selective state bridging, and joint safety supervision across recurrent depths. Across model scales, multiple attack methods, and safety benchmarks, SafeBridge substantially reduces attack success for both matched-depth and cross-depth attacks. It also improves general utility over the vanilla models while maintaining comparable over-refusal behavior. Our results show that the safety of a LoopLM cannot be inferred from a single recurrent depth, motivating safety alignment across recurrent computation. Our code and model checkpoints will be released upon acceptance.
25 pages, 6 figures. Submitted to ICLR 2027
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2610.10625 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2610.10625v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.10625 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Text integral sub licența deschisă a publicației · 333 cuvinte
Subiecte conexe
The J-Space Debate, Agent Swarms, and Pacing Frontier AI - Digital Minds Newsletter #4
LessWrong · 18 sept. 2026

[AINews] Reality Checks on AI News (Yegge shuts down Gas Town, Databricks’ +60% Astra cost)
Latent Space · 17 sept. 2026
[AINews] High Taste Testers Ep. 1
Latent Space · 17 oct. 2026

[AINews] not much happened today
Latent Space · 3 oct. 2026