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This paper proposes a novel Loop-Back architecture for quantum key distribution where passive users manipulate a single traveling qubit without local sources or detectors. By leveraging rotational symmetries in Bell-state preparations, the protocol certifies shared secret keys even against an endpoint mediator that controls the ancilla and measurement apparatus. The work remains theoretical, offering a specific method to generate raw-key bits while acknowledging limitations regarding composable security and experimental validation.
Rotational Bell-State Loop-Back Key Establishment and Agreement Certification for Passive Users
arXiv:2606.19551v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Server-aided Bell-state networks with sequential local encoding are an established approach to mediated key distribution. Against this background, we study a Loop-Back architecture in which two source-free, detector-free users transform the same traveling qubit. Alice privately samples $r\in\mathbb{Z}*2^2$, prepares $|\beta_r\rangle$ over the complete Bell basis, retains one qubit, and uses $r$ as the reference for the returned pair. A deterministic Pauli-composition mode, $U*{\mathrm{eff}}=U_2U_1$, serves as a reference to prior serial-unitary protocols. The main extension instead uses the two same-axis settings $R(\pm\alpha)$ and a reference-versus-complement Bell test. Opposite rotations cancel, whereas equal rotations add, so $P(C\mid\mathrm{disagreement})=0$ and $P(C\mid\mathrm{agreement})=\sin^2(2\alpha)$. At $\alpha=\pi/8$, agreement is certified with probability $1/2$, and the overall conclusive-key probability is $1/4$ for unbiased choices. The same event supplies one shared raw-key bit. For the Pauli mode, a one-qubit Pauli twirl hides either user's factor from an endpoint mediator that may prepare an arbitrary qubit--ancilla state and choose the final measurement, provided the other Pauli is uniform and the traveler is inaccessible between users. The rotational guarantee is narrower: common-sign privacy holds only for the prescribed Bell source and coarse-grained instrument. A polarization implementation can normalize the private reference to the singlet and use a beam splitter with verified two-photon detection; loss produces a third, discarded outcome. The proposal is theoretical and does not claim composable security or experimental validation.
Abstract:Server-aided Bell-state networks with sequential local encoding are an established approach to mediated key distribution. Against this background, we study a Loop-Back architecture in which two source-free, detector-free users transform the same traveling qubit. Alice privately samples $r\in\mathbb{Z}*2^2$, prepares $|\beta_r\rangle$ over the complete Bell basis, retains one qubit, and uses $r$ as the reference for the returned pair. A deterministic Pauli-composition mode, $U*{\mathrm{eff}}=U_2U_1$, serves as a reference to prior serial-unitary protocols. The main extension instead uses the two same-axis settings $R(\pm\alpha)$ and a reference-versus-complement Bell test. Opposite rotations cancel, whereas equal rotations add, so $P(C\mid\mathrm{disagreement})=0$ and $P(C\mid\mathrm{agreement})=\sin^2(2\alpha)$. At $\alpha=\pi/8$, agreement is certified with probability $1/2$, and the overall conclusive-key probability is $1/4$ for unbiased choices. The same event supplies one shared raw-key bit. For the Pauli mode, a one-qubit Pauli twirl hides either user's factor from an endpoint mediator that may prepare an arbitrary qubit--ancilla state and choose the final measurement, provided the other Pauli is uniform and the traveler is inaccessible between users. The rotational guarantee is narrower: common-sign privacy holds only for the prescribed Bell source and coarse-grained instrument. A polarization implementation can normalize the private reference to the singlet and use a beam splitter with verified two-photon detection; loss produces a third, discarded outcome. The proposal is theoretical and does not claim composable security or experimental validation.
Quantum Physics (quant-ph); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
arXiv:2606.19551 [quant-ph]
(or arXiv:2606.19551v2 [quant-ph] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.19551 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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