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This research addresses a critical gap in autonomous robotics by introducing RobResilience, a framework that distinguishes between tolerable performance degradation and catastrophic failure during active cyberattacks on embodied systems. By evaluating runtime predicates for disruption and mitigation feasibility within a ROS2 simulation, the study provides a formal method to prevent graceful failure paralysis in safety-critical physical environments.
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RobResilience: Implementing and Evaluating a Resilience Framework for Cyber-Physical Embodied Systems

arXiv2 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2609.17349v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In embodied cyber-physical systems, active cyberattacks pose an immediate threat not just to data, but to physical integrity and human safety. While existing security approaches excel at detection, they lack the runtime mechanisms to determine whether a disruption is tolerable or if performance degradation remains within safe operational bounds. This gap leaves autonomous systems vulnerable to graceful failure paralysis, where they cannot distinguish between a safe, degraded state and a catastrophic hazard during an ongoing attack. This paper presents RobResilience, an implementation of a formal resilience framework for embodied cyber-physical systems in a Webots simulation environment, using a PR2 robot and ROS2. The framework evaluates three predicates at runtime: tolerable disruption ($\delta$), tolerable degradation ($\gamma$), and mitigation feasibility ($\mu$), over a compromised device set derived from IDS confidence scores. When resilience is lost, the framework triggers available mitigation strategies. We evaluate our implementation through eight attack scenarios that systematically cover all possible combinations of the predicate state space, varying attack targets, degradation rates, and mitigation availability. Results confirm that the runtime behaviour of the implementation is consistent with the theoretical definitions.

Abstract:In embodied cyber-physical systems, active cyberattacks pose an immediate threat not just to data, but to physical integrity and human safety. While existing security approaches excel at detection, they lack the runtime mechanisms to determine whether a disruption is tolerable or if performance degradation remains within safe operational bounds. This gap leaves autonomous systems vulnerable to graceful failure paralysis, where they cannot distinguish between a safe, degraded state and a catastrophic hazard during an ongoing attack. This paper presents RobResilience, an implementation of a formal resilience framework for embodied cyber-physical systems in a Webots simulation environment, using a PR2 robot and ROS2. The framework evaluates three predicates at runtime: tolerable disruption ($\delta$), tolerable degradation ($\gamma$), and mitigation feasibility ($\mu$), over a compromised device set derived from IDS confidence scores. When resilience is lost, the framework triggers available mitigation strategies. We evaluate our implementation through eight attack scenarios that systematically cover all possible combinations of the predicate state space, varying attack targets, degradation rates, and mitigation availability. Results confirm that the runtime behaviour of the implementation is consistent with the theoretical definitions.

13 pages, 11 figures. Published in Proceedings of the 2026 Workshop on CPS & IoT Security and Privacy (CPSIoTSec '26), co-located with ACM CCS 2026. Code: this https URL

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Robotics (cs.RO); Systems and Control (eess.SY)

arXiv:2609.17349 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2609.17349v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.17349 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

https://doi.org/10.1145/3847353.3847504 DOI(s) linking to related resources

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