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This paper proposes a risk-calibrated framework for streaming intrusion detection that integrates Bayesian Online Changepoint Detection with Site Reliability Engineering error budgets. By mapping probabilistic posteriors to operational cost functions, the method adapts to concept drift while strictly adhering to availability SLOs and false-alarm constraints. The approach demonstrates improved precision-recall trade-offs on standard cybersecurity benchmarks, offering a principled way to balance detection sensitivity with system stability in production environments.
Risk-Calibrated Bayesian Streaming Intrusion Detection with SRE-Aligned Decisions
arXiv:2510.09619v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: [Corrected v2: an audit found that the score, threshold, and latency descriptions below are not what the shared codebase implements, and that the evaluation streams are assembled constructions. See the correction note on the title page and the corrected companion work, arXiv:2605.24696 (corrected v3), artifact doi:10.5281/zenodo.22673735.] We present a risk-calibrated approach to streaming intrusion detection that couples Bayesian Online Changepoint Detection (BOCPD) with decision thresholds aligned to Site Reliability Engineering (SRE) error budgets. BOCPD provides run-length posteriors that adapt to distribution shift and concept drift; we map these posteriors to alert decisions by optimizing expected operational cost under false-positive and false-negative budgets. We detail the hazard model, conjugate updates, and an O(1)-per-event implementation. A concrete SRE example shows how a 99.9% availability SLO (43.2 minutes per month error budget) yields a probability threshold near 0.91 when missed incidents are 10x more costly than false alarms. We evaluate on the full UNSW-NB15 and CIC-IDS2017 benchmarks with chronological splits, comparing against strong unsupervised baselines (ECOD, COPOD, and LOF). Metrics include PR-AUC, ROC-AUC, Brier score, calibration reliability diagrams, and detection latency measured in events. Results indicate improved precision-recall at mid to high recall and better probability calibration relative to baselines. We release implementation details, hyperparameters, and ablations for hazard sensitivity and computational footprint. Code and reproducibility materials will be made available upon publication; datasets and implementation are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
Abstract:[Corrected v2: an audit found that the score, threshold, and latency descriptions below are not what the shared codebase implements, and that the evaluation streams are assembled constructions. See the correction note on the title page and the corrected companion work, arXiv:2605.24696 (corrected v3), artifact doi:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22673735.] We present a risk-calibrated approach to streaming intrusion detection that couples Bayesian Online Changepoint Detection (BOCPD) with decision thresholds aligned to Site Reliability Engineering (SRE) error budgets. BOCPD provides run-length posteriors that adapt to distribution shift and concept drift; we map these posteriors to alert decisions by optimizing expected operational cost under false-positive and false-negative budgets. We detail the hazard model, conjugate updates, and an O(1)-per-event implementation. A concrete SRE example shows how a 99.9% availability SLO (43.2 minutes per month error budget) yields a probability threshold near 0.91 when missed incidents are 10x more costly than false alarms. We evaluate on the full UNSW-NB15 and CIC-IDS2017 benchmarks with chronological splits, comparing against strong unsupervised baselines (ECOD, COPOD, and LOF). Metrics include PR-AUC, ROC-AUC, Brier score, calibration reliability diagrams, and detection latency measured in events. Results indicate improved precision-recall at mid to high recall and better probability calibration relative to baselines. We release implementation details, hyperparameters, and ablations for hazard sensitivity and computational footprint. Code and reproducibility materials will be made available upon publication; datasets and implementation are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
v2: correction note added (title page and abstract). An audit of the shared codebase found the score, threshold, and latency descriptions unsupported by the implementation, and the evaluation streams to be assembled constructions. No quantitative result tables are affected. See arXiv:2605.24696 (corrected v3) and doi:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22673735
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
C.2.3; D.4.6; I.2.6; I.5.1; K.6.5
arXiv:2510.09619 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2510.09619v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
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