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This research reveals that an LLM's ability to adhere to its own moral judgments depends critically on post-training recipes rather than just the underlying model weights. Specifically, models like OLMo-3 and Meta's Llama-3.1 exhibit a significant gap where they act against their stated values under pressure, whereas Tulu 3 and Qwen2.5 do not show this behavior across tested scenarios. The study identifies reasoning about stakes and explicitly naming norms as effective interventions to align actions with judgments, marking these as measurable targets for future alignment training.
Principled Under Pressure: Post-Training Decides Whether LLMs Act on Their Own Moral Judgment
arXiv:2610.08670v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language models increasingly act as agents. An agent that says an action is wrong and then takes it anyway is a different failure from one that does not know better, and evaluations of stated values cannot see it. We build a pre-registered panel of 248 scenarios across five kinds of pressure. Each scenario is posed twice to the same model, once as the agent choosing what to do and once in the third person asking which option is right, so the model's own judgment is the reference. Every scenario has a twin with the pressure removed, and every model gets a positive control in which its operator orders the violating action, so that a missing gap can be told apart from a blind instrument. On OLMo-3-7B-Instruct, the model takes the action it judged wrong on about one in five pressuring scenarios, more often than on the same scenarios with the pressure removed. Across four instruct models the gap depends on the post-training recipe: OLMo-3 and Meta's Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct carry it; Tulu 3 shows none on the whole panel (above about 0.01 in probability) or on its own most-pressuring scenarios; Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct shows none on the whole panel (above about 0.02) and is unresolved on its own (0.083, -0.028 to 0.195). Meta's recipe and Ai2's Tulu 3 start from the same Llama-3.1 weights, and only Meta's carries the gap. Reading a chat model outside its chat template reverses the sign of its gap with nothing at stake (-0.038 against +0.055 under the template on OLMo-3), a distortion present on two of three recipes. On both models that carry it, reasoning about the stakes before acting moves the choice back toward the model's own judgment, against a same-length non-moral task, with or without the pressure; on OLMo-3, naming the norm at stake does about a third of that. The gap is a measurable target for post-training recipes, not a fixed property of pretrained weights.
Abstract:Language models increasingly act as agents. An agent that says an action is wrong and then takes it anyway is a different failure from one that does not know better, and evaluations of stated values cannot see it. We build a pre-registered panel of 248 scenarios across five kinds of pressure. Each scenario is posed twice to the same model, once as the agent choosing what to do and once in the third person asking which option is right, so the model's own judgment is the reference. Every scenario has a twin with the pressure removed, and every model gets a positive control in which its operator orders the violating action, so that a missing gap can be told apart from a blind instrument. On OLMo-3-7B-Instruct, the model takes the action it judged wrong on about one in five pressuring scenarios, more often than on the same scenarios with the pressure removed. Across four instruct models the gap depends on the post-training recipe: OLMo-3 and Meta's Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct carry it; Tulu 3 shows none on the whole panel (above about 0.01 in probability) or on its own most-pressuring scenarios; Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct shows none on the whole panel (above about 0.02) and is unresolved on its own (0.083, -0.028 to 0.195). Meta's recipe and Ai2's Tulu 3 start from the same Llama-3.1 weights, and only Meta's carries the gap. Reading a chat model outside its chat template reverses the sign of its gap with nothing at stake (-0.038 against +0.055 under the template on OLMo-3), a distortion present on two of three recipes. On both models that carry it, reasoning about the stakes before acting moves the choice back toward the model's own judgment, against a same-length non-moral task, with or without the pressure; on OLMo-3, naming the norm at stake does about a third of that. The gap is a measurable target for post-training recipes, not a fixed property of pretrained weights.
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2610.08670 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2610.08670v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.08670 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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