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PACE introduces a novel security framework for tool-using LLM agents that enforces capability limits by verifying effects against authenticated authority immediately before execution. This approach effectively mitigates risks from poisoned metadata and retrieved content while maintaining high native utility across multiple model families. The method represents a significant advancement in AI safety, specifically addressing the critical gap between artifact vetting and actual side-effect containment.
PACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agents
arXiv:2610.01349v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents turn generated text into real side effects, so poisoned tool metadata, retrieved pages, memory, and reusable skills can steer the next call. Vetting an artifact before admission does not settle this. A safe variant and a leaking variant can produce the same admission evidence, and a sound gate then cannot relax that site for either. We make that condition precise, which leaves the last boundary a deployment can still act on. We present Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement (PACE), which mediates every tool call immediately before it executes. Path confinement proposes an executable cut of represented influence paths, while capability and effect verification checks schema-defined effects against authority compiled from the authenticated request. We distinguish the certified execution contract from the evaluated configuration, which can restore an authorized call after a proposed block or apply a declared repair. Confinement requires the final action to preserve the certified cut. On eight executable agent-security benchmarks with three target-model families, the evaluated configuration gives strictly lowest attack success in 62 of 79 eligible attack columns and ties in 14; full-benchmark native utility loses at most three points relative to the undefended agent. A complete ablation over 1167 paired cases attributes most security gains to effect verification and refusal control to boundary adaptation. A reduced-scale adaptive search succeeds on 0/30 out-of-authority targets against the defense.
Abstract:Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents turn generated text into real side effects, so poisoned tool metadata, retrieved pages, memory, and reusable skills can steer the next call. Vetting an artifact before admission does not settle this. A safe variant and a leaking variant can produce the same admission evidence, and a sound gate then cannot relax that site for either. We make that condition precise, which leaves the last boundary a deployment can still act on. We present Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement (PACE), which mediates every tool call immediately before it executes. Path confinement proposes an executable cut of represented influence paths, while capability and effect verification checks schema-defined effects against authority compiled from the authenticated request. We distinguish the certified execution contract from the evaluated configuration, which can restore an authorized call after a proposed block or apply a declared repair. Confinement requires the final action to preserve the certified cut. On eight executable agent-security benchmarks with three target-model families, the evaluated configuration gives strictly lowest attack success in 62 of 79 eligible attack columns and ties in 14; full-benchmark native utility loses at most three points relative to the undefended agent. A complete ablation over 1167 paired cases attributes most security gains to effect verification and refusal control to boundary adaptation. A reduced-scale adaptive search succeeds on 0/30 out-of-authority targets against the defense.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2610.01349 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2610.01349v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.01349 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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