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This research identifies a critical security vulnerability in "System One" AI models, where attacker-controlled semantic contexts can hijack program logic via schema-valid judgments. The authors demonstrate that over 81% of real-world applications are susceptible to decision flips with severe downstream security consequences, highlighting the need for robust defenses beyond standard model-level evaluations.
Nudge the Judge: Uncovering Program Decision Hijacking in Real-World Jev Applications
arXiv:2610.18612v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: System One models such as Jev change how software makes decisions by mapping open-ended semantic contexts into structured judgments that directly drive program execution. However, this paradigm introduces a new security risk, which we term Jev Program Decision Hijacking (JPDH): attacker-controlled contexts can redirect program decisions through schema-valid Jev judgments. Existing evaluations focus primarily on model-level attacks or predefined injection channels, leaving attack reachability and downstream security consequences in real-world Jev applications underexplored. In this paper, we present JevProbe, the first automated framework to evaluate JPDH by tracing adversarial influence from reachable context surfaces through program-consumed decisions to downstream security consequences in real-world Jev applications. Our key insight is that application logic maps diverse Jev judgments to observable decisions, enabling systematic, program-grounded attack evaluation. Across 228 popular real-world Jev applications and 2,273 test cases, 81.5% exhibit decision flips, of which 98.6% lead to potential downstream security impacts. Compared with the strongest adapted baseline, JevProbe improves macro-average Decision Flip Rate (DFR) by 50.4 percentage points, while existing defenses offer limited protection. We further construct JevProbeBench to support systematic evaluation of JPDH in real-world Jev applications. We have responsibly disclosed our findings to Jev application maintainers, pending their responses. The source code of JevProbe and the JevProbeBench dataset are publicly available on GitHub (https://github.com/xiaoxiaohg8d/JevProbe-).
Abstract:System One models such as Jev change how software makes decisions by mapping open-ended semantic contexts into structured judgments that directly drive program execution. However, this paradigm introduces a new security risk, which we term Jev Program Decision Hijacking (JPDH): attacker-controlled contexts can redirect program decisions through schema-valid Jev judgments. Existing evaluations focus primarily on model-level attacks or predefined injection channels, leaving attack reachability and downstream security consequences in real-world Jev applications underexplored. In this paper, we present JevProbe, the first automated framework to evaluate JPDH by tracing adversarial influence from reachable context surfaces through program-consumed decisions to downstream security consequences in real-world Jev applications. Our key insight is that application logic maps diverse Jev judgments to observable decisions, enabling systematic, program-grounded attack evaluation. Across 228 popular real-world Jev applications and 2,273 test cases, 81.5% exhibit decision flips, of which 98.6% lead to potential downstream security impacts. Compared with the strongest adapted baseline, JevProbe improves macro-average Decision Flip Rate (DFR) by 50.4 percentage points, while existing defenses offer limited protection. We further construct JevProbeBench to support systematic evaluation of JPDH in real-world Jev applications. We have responsibly disclosed our findings to Jev application maintainers, pending their responses. The source code of JevProbe and the JevProbeBench dataset are publicly available on GitHub (this https URL).
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2610.18612 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2610.18612v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.18612 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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