analiza aiqbench
NOMOS addresses the critical safety gap where tool-using LLM agents bypass their own policies by compiling natural-language rules into deterministic, statically verified gates. This approach eliminates reliance on external provers or solvers during runtime, reducing decision latency to microseconds while significantly lowering attack success rates across banking and retail benchmarks. The method effectively repairs inoperable hand-written rules and rejects unsafe candidates without compromising legitimate task execution.
NOMOS: Compiling Written Policies into Statically Verified Tool-Call Gates for LLM Agents
arXiv:2610.11030v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using LLM agents violate the policies they are deployed to enforce, often silently. Prior defenses hand-write rules, query an LLM verifier per action, or compile policies through heavyweight formal machinery. Naive compilation fails: extracted rules block the tool satisfying their own precondition, or read arguments their tool lacks. NOMOS, a four-pass compiler, turns a natural-language policy into a deterministic tool-call gate; static verification with tool-schema-level checks alone (no prover, solver, or LLM) repairs or rejects 37% (airline) and 13% (retail) of candidates, without which most shipped rules are inoperable. Replaying compiled rules over undefended transcripts flags bindings that refuse legitimate work (a development binding refused 95.9% of task-passing calls); no evaluation binding is flagged. On $\tau^2$-bench the gate cuts violations of reference-encoded clauses among state-changing calls from 66.3% to 2.6% (airline) and 30.8% to 6.9% (retail), raising airline task success significantly for $2 \le k \le 4$; a 26B on-premise compilation is not significantly worse than hand-written or frontier-compiled rules. Unlike AgentDojo's shipped defenses, it reaches a zero attack success rate (ASR) on banking, where nine attack families collapse onto three structural rules. On the other three suites its ASR is at most 3.6%, from goals with no tool call to govern and one write admitted by a binding weaker than its clause; a second agent model, Llama-3.3-70B, reproduces the effect on both benchmarks. Decisions take microseconds without an LLM call, at a domain-dependent benign-utility cost; compilation runs on-premise on open-weight gemma-4-26B.
Abstract:Tool-using LLM agents violate the policies they are deployed to enforce, often silently. Prior defenses hand-write rules, query an LLM verifier per action, or compile policies through heavyweight formal machinery. Naive compilation fails: extracted rules block the tool satisfying their own precondition, or read arguments their tool lacks. NOMOS, a four-pass compiler, turns a natural-language policy into a deterministic tool-call gate; static verification with tool-schema-level checks alone (no prover, solver, or LLM) repairs or rejects 37% (airline) and 13% (retail) of candidates, without which most shipped rules are inoperable. Replaying compiled rules over undefended transcripts flags bindings that refuse legitimate work (a development binding refused 95.9% of task-passing calls); no evaluation binding is flagged. On $\tau^2$-bench the gate cuts violations of reference-encoded clauses among state-changing calls from 66.3% to 2.6% (airline) and 30.8% to 6.9% (retail), raising airline task success significantly for $2 \le k \le 4$; a 26B on-premise compilation is not significantly worse than hand-written or frontier-compiled rules. Unlike AgentDojo's shipped defenses, it reaches a zero attack success rate (ASR) on banking, where nine attack families collapse onto three structural rules. On the other three suites its ASR is at most 3.6%, from goals with no tool call to govern and one write admitted by a binding weaker than its clause; a second agent model, Llama-3.3-70B, reproduces the effect on both benchmarks. Decisions take microseconds without an LLM call, at a domain-dependent benign-utility cost; compilation runs on-premise on open-weight gemma-4-26B.
28 pages, 5 figures, 19 tables. Submitted to IEEE Access
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2610.11030 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2610.11030v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.11030 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22123420 Focus to learn more DOI(s) linking to related resources
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