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This study exposes a critical flaw in LLM fact-checking benchmarks, revealing that aggregate accuracy scores often mask "parametric leakage" where models utilize information unavailable at the time of the claim. By distinguishing between memorized outcomes and retrieved future evidence, the research demonstrates that standard evaluations significantly overstate the real-world reliability of misinformation detectors. These findings are essential for researchers aiming to build robust verification systems that strictly adhere to temporal constraints.
No Hindsight for LLM Fact-Checkers: Measuring Leakage Channels in Misinformation Detection
arXiv:2610.04888v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As automated fact-checking scales on social media, large language model (LLM) verdict scores can look stronger than warranted. One reason is that evaluations mix in information that was not knowable at claim time. Two channels are easy to conflate: outcomes memorized in pre-training and retrieved evidence published after the claim. Yet standard benchmarks rarely separate the two. In this study we measure both channels on AVeriTeC and QuanTemp++ by reconstructing point-in-time evidence conditions and probing for outcome information encoded in model representations. We find substantial evidence of parametric leakage, that can be hidden by the aggregate accuracy, while a simple representation bottleneck reduces this future leakage more efficiently than a mutual-information-based training penalty. We also find that allowing post-claim evidence inflates zero-shot accuracy by 6.3 points in AVeriTeC while the effect is negligible in QuanTemp++, where retrieval provides little post-claim evidence. These results show that misinformation benchmarks can overstate fact-checking performance when they do not account for what information was actually available at claim time.
Abstract:As automated fact-checking scales on social media, large language model (LLM) verdict scores can look stronger than warranted. One reason is that evaluations mix in information that was not knowable at claim time. Two channels are easy to conflate: outcomes memorized in pre-training and retrieved evidence published after the claim. Yet standard benchmarks rarely separate the two. In this study we measure both channels on AVeriTeC and QuanTemp++ by reconstructing point-in-time evidence conditions and probing for outcome information encoded in model representations. We find substantial evidence of parametric leakage, that can be hidden by the aggregate accuracy, while a simple representation bottleneck reduces this future leakage more efficiently than a mutual-information-based training penalty. We also find that allowing post-claim evidence inflates zero-shot accuracy by 6.3 points in AVeriTeC while the effect is negligible in QuanTemp++, where retrieval provides little post-claim evidence. These results show that misinformation benchmarks can overstate fact-checking performance when they do not account for what information was actually available at claim time.
Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2610.04888 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2610.04888v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.04888 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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