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This research introduces "Nash decoding," a novel framework that reformulates text generation as a game-theoretic problem to achieve significantly higher likelihood scores than standard autoregressive methods. By treating token positions as players in a Nash equilibrium, the approach improves performance on question-answering benchmarks without requiring model fine-tuning, though it does incur additional test-time computational costs.
Nash Equilibrium Text: A Game-Theoretic Decoding Framework for Text Generation
arXiv:2610.05817v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Text revision has become an integral component of large language models. This paper formulates revision such that it admits a Nash equilibrium: Token positions are players, vocabulary items are actions, and each player's utility is the language model's log conditional probability. We motivate the revision by showing that Nash equilibria can have exponentially higher likelihood than autoregressive outputs as the sequence length grows. We further propose Nash decoding, an algorithm that reaches an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in $O(1/\varepsilon)$ time given access to the joint probability of tokens conditioned on a prompt. In practice, we run Nash decoding using conditional probability estimates from large language models and evaluate the resulting equilibria on question-answering benchmarks. On CLAPNQ, PubMedQA, and CoQA, Nash equilibria obtained from masked language models achieve higher F1 and ROUGE scores than autoregressive models up to $18\times$ larger, without any fine-tuning or retraining, at the cost of additional test-time computation.
Abstract:Text revision has become an integral component of large language models. This paper formulates revision such that it admits a Nash equilibrium: Token positions are players, vocabulary items are actions, and each player's utility is the language model's log conditional probability. We motivate the revision by showing that Nash equilibria can have exponentially higher likelihood than autoregressive outputs as the sequence length grows. We further propose Nash decoding, an algorithm that reaches an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in $O(1/\varepsilon)$ time given access to the joint probability of tokens conditioned on a prompt. In practice, we run Nash decoding using conditional probability estimates from large language models and evaluate the resulting equilibria on question-answering benchmarks. On CLAPNQ, PubMedQA, and CoQA, Nash equilibria obtained from masked language models achieve higher F1 and ROUGE scores than autoregressive models up to $18\times$ larger, without any fine-tuning or retraining, at the cost of additional test-time computation.
34 pages, 6 figures, 11 tables. Code: this https URL
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2610.05817 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2610.05817v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.05817 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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