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This research introduces Multi-Level Distributional Entropy (MDE), a method that extracts interpretable information-theoretic features directly from pre-aggregated network flow statistics without requiring raw packet sequences. By pairing these features with a rigorous, leakage-free evaluation protocol, the study exposes critical failure modes in standard intrusion detection systems where high aggregate F1 scores mask poor detection rates for specific attack families. The work advances machine learning security by providing grounded, reproducible representations that enhance model transparency and reliability rather than merely boosting accuracy metrics.
Multi-Level Distributional Entropy from Flow Summary Statistics for Explainable Network Intrusion Detection
arXiv:2606.29797v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Machine learning network intrusion detection systems (IDS) operate on aggregate flow statistics that discard the distributional structure of traffic, and although information-theoretic measures capture that structure, established entropy estimators require raw packet sequences that pre-aggregated flow datasets do not contain. No prior method derives entropy from the summary statistics those records already hold. We introduce Multi-Level Distributional Entropy (MDE), which computes interpretable information-theoretic features analytically from flow-level summary statistics at three levels, within-flow Gaussian differential entropy, cross-directional Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD), and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) flag-incidence Shannon entropy, with closed-form properties and no raw packet access; only imputation medians and score bounds are fitted on the training split. We pair the features with a leakage-free, fold-local evaluation protocol that reports the full operational metric suite across cross-validation, temporal, pseudo-live, cross-dataset, and unseen-attack-family settings, on four benchmarks (NSL-KDD, CICIDS-2017, CICIDS-2018, UNSW-NB15) with tree-ensemble classifiers and SHAP. The protocol exposes failure modes that aggregate weighted F1 conceals: on CICIDS-2018 an F1 of 0.73 hides a detection rate (DR) of 0.44, on held-out attack families F1 exceeds 0.998 while DR falls to zero, and a 703K-flow pseudo-live replay reveals a threshold-ranking divergence in which score ranking is largely preserved (area under the ROC curve, AUC, 0.84 to 0.86) while fixed-threshold detection collapses (DR 0.08). The entropy features match conventional features within 0.1 percentage points of F1 and receive reproducible SHAP attributions (Spearman 0.84 to 0.94), so their contribution is a grounded, interpretable representation and an evaluation methodology rather than an accuracy gain.
Abstract:Machine learning network intrusion detection systems (IDS) operate on aggregate flow statistics that discard the distributional structure of traffic, and although information-theoretic measures capture that structure, established entropy estimators require raw packet sequences that pre-aggregated flow datasets do not contain. No prior method derives entropy from the summary statistics those records already hold. We introduce Multi-Level Distributional Entropy (MDE), which computes interpretable information-theoretic features analytically from flow-level summary statistics at three levels, within-flow Gaussian differential entropy, cross-directional Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD), and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) flag-incidence Shannon entropy, with closed-form properties and no raw packet access; only imputation medians and score bounds are fitted on the training split. We pair the features with a leakage-free, fold-local evaluation protocol that reports the full operational metric suite across cross-validation, temporal, pseudo-live, cross-dataset, and unseen-attack-family settings, on four benchmarks (NSL-KDD, CICIDS-2017, CICIDS-2018, UNSW-NB15) with tree-ensemble classifiers and SHAP. The protocol exposes failure modes that aggregate weighted F1 conceals: on CICIDS-2018 an F1 of 0.73 hides a detection rate (DR) of 0.44, on held-out attack families F1 exceeds 0.998 while DR falls to zero, and a 703K-flow pseudo-live replay reveals a threshold-ranking divergence in which score ranking is largely preserved (area under the ROC curve, AUC, 0.84 to 0.86) while fixed-threshold detection collapses (DR 0.08). The entropy features match conventional features within 0.1 percentage points of F1 and receive reproducible SHAP attributions (Spearman 0.84 to 0.94), so their contribution is a grounded, interpretable representation and an evaluation methodology rather than an accuracy gain.
21 pages. v2: retitled from "Multi-Level Distributional Entropy for Explainable Network Intrusion Detection"; the paper now foregrounds the analytic, packet-free derivation of entropy features from flow summary statistics and the leakage-free evaluation methodology that exposes failure modes an aggregate F1 conceals. Code: this https URL
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2606.29797 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.29797v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
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