Moral Competence Before Moral Content: Why LLM Agents Lack the Prerequisites for Coherent Alignment

arXiv:2609.05036v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI alignment requires AI systems to adhere to human norms, values, or intentions. Under value pluralism there is no correct target, but a shared prerequisite is that the system's behavior expresses a coherent policy: a mapping from situations to verdicts that is invariant while a situation's morally relevant features are preserved, and sensitive when they change. We introduce four structural conditions for such coherent policies: verdict stability, monotonicity, decisiveness, and Pareto viability. Together they measure a form of moral competence that is evaluable from behavior alone, without reference to a moral standard or expert baseline, forming a structural floor for alignment rather than a normative target. We demonstrate the methodology on three simulated deployments featuring LLM-based agents facing moral dilemmas. Evaluating nine frontier models under a factorial design of five paraphrases, five escalation levels, and three dominance conditions, we show no model expresses a coherent policy across the three deployments: surface-form perturbation alone produces verdict-rate shifts of up to $99$ percentage points at a single escalation level, and a model's success on one scenario does not predict its competence on another. This suggests LLM-based agents are not currently the kind of object to which alignment can meaningfully apply.

Abstract:AI alignment requires AI systems to adhere to human norms, values, or intentions. Under value pluralism there is no correct target, but a shared prerequisite is that the system's behavior expresses a coherent policy: a mapping from situations to verdicts that is invariant while a situation's morally relevant features are preserved, and sensitive when they change. We introduce four structural conditions for such coherent policies: verdict stability, monotonicity, decisiveness, and Pareto viability. Together they measure a form of moral competence that is evaluable from behavior alone, without reference to a moral standard or expert baseline, forming a structural floor for alignment rather than a normative target. We demonstrate the methodology on three simulated deployments featuring LLM-based agents facing moral dilemmas. Evaluating nine frontier models under a factorial design of five paraphrases, five escalation levels, and three dominance conditions, we show no model expresses a coherent policy across the three deployments: surface-form perturbation alone produces verdict-rate shifts of up to $99$ percentage points at a single escalation level, and a model's success on one scenario does not predict its competence on another. This suggests LLM-based agents are not currently the kind of object to which alignment can meaningfully apply.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computers and Society (cs.CY)

I.2.0; I.2.11; K.4.1

arXiv:2609.05036 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2609.05036v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.05036 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Moral Competence Before Moral Content: Why LLM Agents Lack the Prerequisites for Coherent Alignment

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