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This research extends quantum lattice reduction attacks from ideal to module lattices over cyclotomic rings, achieving a Hermite factor that matches the ideal case while maintaining a rank-independent reduction factor. By reformulating sign selection as a mixed-integer linear program and optimizing rounding precision via the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the authors eliminate previous heuristic discrepancies and enable bounded-precision implementations. These theoretical advances directly impact the security assessment of MLWE-based cryptographic schemes against future quantum adversaries.
Surse care acoperăarXiv, Astera Labs, METR, Latent Space

Module Lattice Security (Part II): Module Lattice Reduction via Optimal Sign Selection

arXiv2 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2604.22900v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We extend the CDPR's quantum attack from ideal lattices to module lattices over $2^k$-th cyclotomic rings. Using trace orthogonality of the power basis, we decompose a rank-$d$ module into mutually orthogonal rank-$1$ submodules, and apply CDPR's analysis to each independently and return the shortest candidate. The Hermite factor $\exp(\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n}))$ matches the ideal case, with a module reduction factor $\alpha_d=O(1)$ independent of the rank, under a balance hypothesis (proved for Gaussian distribution) automatic for MLWE-distributed bases. To enable a bounded-precision implementation, we replace coordinate-wise rounding with Chinese Remainder Theorem-scaled rounding at totally split primes, reducing the Gram-Schmidt rounding radius from $n/2$ to $\le 1$ at cost $O(d^2 r n \log n)$. Finally, we reformulate the CDPR's sign-selection step as a mixed-integer linear program and prove its optimum is no more than 1/2 for all $k$ ($\approx 0.4407$ for all tested $k\le 12$, conjecturally universal). This replaces the previous heuristic discrepancy $\Theta(\sqrt{nk})$. All results build on the class number condition $h_k^+=1$ established in Part I of this series.

Abstract:We extend the CDPR's quantum attack from ideal lattices to module lattices over $2^k$-th cyclotomic rings. Using trace orthogonality of the power basis, we decompose a rank-$d$ module into mutually orthogonal rank-$1$ submodules, and apply CDPR's analysis to each independently and return the shortest candidate. The Hermite factor $\exp(\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n}))$ matches the ideal case, with a module reduction factor $\alpha_d=O(1)$ independent of the rank, under a balance hypothesis (proved for Gaussian distribution) automatic for MLWE-distributed bases. To enable a bounded-precision implementation, we replace coordinate-wise rounding with Chinese Remainder Theorem-scaled rounding at totally split primes, reducing the Gram-Schmidt rounding radius from $n/2$ to $\le 1$ at cost $O(d^2 r n \log n)$. Finally, we reformulate the CDPR's sign-selection step as a mixed-integer linear program and prove its optimum is no more than 1/2 for all $k$ ($\approx 0.4407$ for all tested $k\le 12$, conjecturally universal). This replaces the previous heuristic discrepancy $\Theta(\sqrt{nk})$. All results build on the class number condition $h_k^+=1$ established in Part I of this series.

30 pages, add new results and proofs of previous simulations and examples. The key change is alpha_d=sqrt C which is changed into this http URL does not affect all the polynomical algorithms in Part IV. For simulation video see the comment of Part IV in this series

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Information Theory (cs.IT); Quantum Physics (quant-ph)

arXiv:2604.22900 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2604.22900v2 [cs.CR] for this version)

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