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This survey addresses a critical gap in AI security by evaluating methods to surgically remove sensitive knowledge from deployed Large Language Models without costly retraining or performance degradation. It highlights the distinction between merely suppressing outputs under standard prompts and achieving genuine, verifiable forgetting of encoded data against adversarial extraction attacks. The analysis underscores that as LLMs integrate into high-stakes sectors like finance and healthcare, robust unlearning mechanisms are becoming essential for regulatory compliance and mitigating privacy risks.
LLM Unlearning for Cyber Defense: A Survey on Methods, Challenges, and Emerging Threats
arXiv:2607.16227v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs are increasingly deployed in security-critical systems across healthcare, finance, education, and decision support, yet their inability to forget creates serious cybersecurity, privacy, and safety risks. Sensitive personal information, copyrighted material, hazardous domain knowledge, and memorized training data remain encoded across billions of parameters long after deployment, leaving models vulnerable to extraction, jailbreak attacks, membership inference, and regulatory non-compliance. Real-world incidents, from chatbots regenerating private information to fabricated legal citations producing direct legal and financial cost, place the problem at the center of the emerging-threats landscape rather than the realm of speculation. Because retraining billion-parameter models on revised corpora is computationally infeasible, and because knowledge within an LLM is distributed and entangled across parameters rather than localized to identifiable units, LLM unlearning has emerged as the principal cyber defense response, aiming to remove or suppress targeted knowledge from a trained model without retraining and without eroding what the model should still know. A central question, however, remains unresolved. Do current methods genuinely remove knowledge, or do they only stop the model from expressing it under ordinary prompting conditions? This survey examines LLM unlearning through the lens of security, robustness, and verifiable forgetting, with primary focus on gradient-based methods, which have come to dominate the field due to their compatibility with existing training pipelines and their scalability to billion-parameter models.
Abstract:LLMs are increasingly deployed in security-critical systems across healthcare, finance, education, and decision support, yet their inability to forget creates serious cybersecurity, privacy, and safety risks. Sensitive personal information, copyrighted material, hazardous domain knowledge, and memorized training data remain encoded across billions of parameters long after deployment, leaving models vulnerable to extraction, jailbreak attacks, membership inference, and regulatory non-compliance. Real-world incidents, from chatbots regenerating private information to fabricated legal citations producing direct legal and financial cost, place the problem at the center of the emerging-threats landscape rather than the realm of speculation. Because retraining billion-parameter models on revised corpora is computationally infeasible, and because knowledge within an LLM is distributed and entangled across parameters rather than localized to identifiable units, LLM unlearning has emerged as the principal cyber defense response, aiming to remove or suppress targeted knowledge from a trained model without retraining and without eroding what the model should still know. A central question, however, remains unresolved. Do current methods genuinely remove knowledge, or do they only stop the model from expressing it under ordinary prompting conditions? This survey examines LLM unlearning through the lens of security, robustness, and verifiable forgetting, with primary focus on gradient-based methods, which have come to dominate the field due to their compatibility with existing training pipelines and their scalability to billion-parameter models.
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
arXiv:2607.16227 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2607.16227v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.16227 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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