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This research identifies a critical vulnerability in deepfake detection systems by demonstrating that AI-generated images fail to replicate the statistical signatures inherent in real camera hardware and ISP pipelines. The proposed ISPCloak framework bypasses computationally expensive optimization methods instead, using invertible networks to project synthetic content into the RAW domain where it mimics authentic sensor noise and processing artifacts. This approach effectively evades current forensic tools by embedding imperceptible physical characteristics that confuse detectors trained on digital synthesis errors alone.
ISPCloak: Weaponizing ISP for Optimization-Free Physical Camouflage against Deepfake Detectors
arXiv:2607.21897v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid advancement of generative models has spurred the critical need to evaluate the worst-case robustness of deepfake detectors. In this paper, we reveal a fundamental blind spot in current forensic paradigms: while existing detectors excel at capturing digital synthesis artifacts, their effectiveness drops drastically when AI-generated content is cloaked in authentic physical imaging characteristics. We posit that genuine photographs inherently possess hardware-intrinsic statistical signatures, which are imperceptible footprints imprinted by optical sensors and Image Signal Processing (ISP) pipelines, and are fundamentally absent in purely data-driven generative models. Driven by this insight, we propose ISPCloak, a novel optimization-free adversarial attack framework that explicitly weaponizes the ISP pipeline to mislead the judgment of deepfake detectors. Rather than relying on computationally expensive gradient perturbations, our method first employs an Invertible ISP network to project images into the RAW domain. Then, we seamlessly imprint the complex statistical priors of real cameras onto AI-generated images by injecting realistic Poisson-Gaussian sensor noise and conducting forward ISP reconstruction. Synergized with generative artifact suppression and adaptive masking, this streamlined physical simulation enables ultra-fast generation of adversarial examples. Extensive experiments show that embedding authentic physical perturbations fundamentally disrupts a broad range of current detection mechanisms, yielding universally evasive adversarial examples with imperceptible visual alterations.
Abstract:The rapid advancement of generative models has spurred the critical need to evaluate the worst-case robustness of deepfake detectors. In this paper, we reveal a fundamental blind spot in current forensic paradigms: while existing detectors excel at capturing digital synthesis artifacts, their effectiveness drops drastically when AI-generated content is cloaked in authentic physical imaging characteristics. We posit that genuine photographs inherently possess hardware-intrinsic statistical signatures, which are imperceptible footprints imprinted by optical sensors and Image Signal Processing (ISP) pipelines, and are fundamentally absent in purely data-driven generative models. Driven by this insight, we propose ISPCloak, a novel optimization-free adversarial attack framework that explicitly weaponizes the ISP pipeline to mislead the judgment of deepfake detectors. Rather than relying on computationally expensive gradient perturbations, our method first employs an Invertible ISP network to project images into the RAW domain. Then, we seamlessly imprint the complex statistical priors of real cameras onto AI-generated images by injecting realistic Poisson-Gaussian sensor noise and conducting forward ISP reconstruction. Synergized with generative artifact suppression and adaptive masking, this streamlined physical simulation enables ultra-fast generation of adversarial examples. Extensive experiments show that embedding authentic physical perturbations fundamentally disrupts a broad range of current detection mechanisms, yielding universally evasive adversarial examples with imperceptible visual alterations.
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
arXiv:2607.21897 [cs.CV]
(or arXiv:2607.21897v1 [cs.CV] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.21897 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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