Sari la conținut

Română · beta. Traducerea a fost făcută automat și este încă în curs de revizuire. Citește pagina în engleză

perspectiva aiqbenchSiguranță AI

analiza aiqbench

This research addresses the strategic tension between defending against gaming adversaries, who manipulate known classifiers, and learning adversaries, who exploit abstention signals to reconstruct decision boundaries. The study demonstrates that standard defense strategies are incomparable in efficacy, with specific query rates required for each threat model confirmed across diverse tasks including tabular data, images, and language model features.
Surse care acoperăarXiv, AI Alignment Forum, AWS, Viakoo
Ce este aceastaLectura unui model asupra articolului și a acoperirii conexe, scrisă pentru aiqbench. Nu sunt cuvintele publicației.

Information Design Against Gaming and Learning Adversaries

arXiv3 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2609.31643v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A principal who deploys a binary classifier with an abstention option must decide which queries the mechanism abstains on. The right choice depends on the adversary. A gaming adversary already knows the classifier and tries to manipulate features across the boundary, so the principal does best by abstaining on queries close to that boundary. The same boundary-localizing rule is the worst possible choice against a learning adversary who does not know the classifier: each abstention now tells the adversary that the boundary is nearby, which is enough to drive a binary search. We analyze this tension. The two natural defenses, abstaining at a fixed rate and abstaining near the boundary, are Blackwell-incomparable: neither can be simulated by post-processing the other's responses. The number of queries needed to reconstruct the boundary to error $\eps$ is $\tilde\Theta(d/\eps)$ under the first defense and $\Theta(d \log(1/\eps))$ under the second, where $d$ is the VC dimension of the classifier family and $\tilde\Theta$ suppresses factors polylogarithmic in $d$ and $1/\eps$. The first rate is a worst case over query distributions; no reconstruction algorithm can close the gap at the distributions that attain it. We characterize the Pareto frontier between the two defense objectives, and confirm both rates on seven binary-classification tasks spanning tabular, image, and language-model-feature inputs: label-plus-counterfactual access extracts the boundary with up to $200\times$ fewer queries than a published label-only baseline.

Abstract:A principal who deploys a binary classifier with an abstention option must decide which queries the mechanism abstains on. The right choice depends on the adversary. A gaming adversary already knows the classifier and tries to manipulate features across the boundary, so the principal does best by abstaining on queries close to that boundary. The same boundary-localizing rule is the worst possible choice against a learning adversary who does not know the classifier: each abstention now tells the adversary that the boundary is nearby, which is enough to drive a binary search. We analyze this tension. The two natural defenses, abstaining at a fixed rate and abstaining near the boundary, are Blackwell-incomparable: neither can be simulated by post-processing the other's responses. The number of queries needed to reconstruct the boundary to error $\eps$ is $\tilde\Theta(d/\eps)$ under the first defense and $\Theta(d \log(1/\eps))$ under the second, where $d$ is the VC dimension of the classifier family and $\tilde\Theta$ suppresses factors polylogarithmic in $d$ and $1/\eps$. The first rate is a worst case over query distributions; no reconstruction algorithm can close the gap at the distributions that attain it. We characterize the Pareto frontier between the two defense objectives, and confirm both rates on seven binary-classification tasks spanning tabular, image, and language-model-feature inputs: label-plus-counterfactual access extracts the boundary with up to $200\times$ fewer queries than a published label-only baseline.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)

arXiv:2609.31643 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2609.31643v1 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.31643 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Text integral sub licența deschisă a publicației · 334 cuvinte

Subiecte conexe