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This research advances cryptographic security by breaking the "one-half barrier" for local leakage resilience in Shamir secret sharing, allowing for more efficient key distribution against side-channel attacks. Furthermore, it presents a quantum algorithm that optimally solves worst-case polynomial intersection problems, demonstrating an unconditional separation between classical and quantum hardness relative to membership oracles. These theoretical improvements directly impact the design of post-quantum secure systems and the understanding of quantum advantages in discrete mathematics.
Improved Local Leakage Resilience of Shamir Secret Sharing and Worst-Case Optimal Polynomial Intersection
arXiv:2610.12357v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study two problems: Local Leakage Resilience (LLR) for Shamir secret sharing, and worst-case Optimal Polynomial Intersection (OPI). Both problems concern polynomials $Q(X)$ of degree less than $k$, over a prime-order finite field $\mathbb{F}_p$. In LLR for Shamir secret sharing, one asks how much one can learn about $Q(0)$ given a few bits leaked from each of $Q(\alpha_1), \ldots, Q(\alpha_n)$, for distinct non-zero evaluation points $\alpha_i \in \mathbb{F}_p$. In OPI, one is given input list $S_1, \ldots, S_n \subset \mathbb{F}_p$, and wants to find a polynomial $Q(X)$ of degree less than $k$ so that $Q(\alpha_i) \in S_i$ for as many $i$ as possible. Leveraging recent connection between these two problems due to (Sun, Wootters 2026), we improve the state-of-the-art for both problems. For LLR, we show that there is some constant $\delta > 0$ so that, as long as $R := k/n \geq 1/2 - \delta$, Shamir secret-sharing is one-bit locally leakage resilient (meaning that one can learn only a negligible amount about $Q(0)$). This is the first result to break the so-called "one-half barrier" for LLR, and improves over the previous best known result, requiring $R \geq 0.668$ (Kasser, 2025). For OPI, we give a quantum algorithm that finds a polynomial $Q(X)$ that agrees with at least a $\mathsf{SCL}_\rho(R)-\varepsilon$ fraction of the lists in expectation, for every fixed $\varepsilon>0$, where $\mathsf{SCL}_\rho$ is the \emph{semicircle law} of (Jordan et al., 2025). This improves previous algorithmic (and existential) results of (Jo, 2026) and (Horinaga, Yamakawa, 2026). We also give further improved existential results. We also adapt the hardness result of (Yamakawa, Zhandry, 2024) to apply to OPI (rather than a folded version); over large fields, this gives an unconditional separation between the quantum and classical hardness of OPI relative to a membership oracle.
Abstract:We study two problems: Local Leakage Resilience (LLR) for Shamir secret sharing, and worst-case Optimal Polynomial Intersection (OPI). Both problems concern polynomials $Q(X)$ of degree less than $k$, over a prime-order finite field $\mathbb{F}_p$. In LLR for Shamir secret sharing, one asks how much one can learn about $Q(0)$ given a few bits leaked from each of $Q(\alpha_1), \ldots, Q(\alpha_n)$, for distinct non-zero evaluation points $\alpha_i \in \mathbb{F}_p$. In OPI, one is given input list $S_1, \ldots, S_n \subset \mathbb{F}_p$, and wants to find a polynomial $Q(X)$ of degree less than $k$ so that $Q(\alpha_i) \in S_i$ for as many $i$ as possible. Leveraging recent connection between these two problems due to (Sun, Wootters 2026), we improve the state-of-the-art for both problems. For LLR, we show that there is some constant $\delta > 0$ so that, as long as $R := k/n \geq 1/2 - \delta$, Shamir secret-sharing is one-bit locally leakage resilient (meaning that one can learn only a negligible amount about $Q(0)$). This is the first result to break the so-called "one-half barrier" for LLR, and improves over the previous best known result, requiring $R \geq 0.668$ (Kasser, 2025). For OPI, we give a quantum algorithm that finds a polynomial $Q(X)$ that agrees with at least a $\mathsf{SCL}_\rho(R)-\varepsilon$ fraction of the lists in expectation, for every fixed $\varepsilon>0$, where $\mathsf{SCL}_\rho$ is the \emph{semicircle law} of (Jordan et al., 2025). This improves previous algorithmic (and existential) results of (Jo, 2026) and (Horinaga, Yamakawa, 2026). We also give further improved existential results. We also adapt the hardness result of (Yamakawa, Zhandry, 2024) to apply to OPI (rather than a folded version); over large fields, this gives an unconditional separation between the quantum and classical hardness of OPI relative to a membership oracle.
Quantum Physics (quant-ph); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Discrete Mathematics (cs.DM); Information Theory (cs.IT)
arXiv:2610.12357 [quant-ph]
(or arXiv:2610.12357v1 [quant-ph] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.12357 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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