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This research definitively closes the security debate on single-qubit quantum position verification by proving no perfect finite-dimensional cheating strategy exists, utilizing tools from real algebraic geometry to resolve a long-standing open question in QPV protocol design. The finding establishes fundamental limits for protocols where provers certify location via simple qubit measurements against orthogonal bases, reinforcing theoretical bounds rather than offering immediate commercial applications.
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Impossibility of perfect cheating for single-qubit position verification

arXiv2 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2406.20022v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In quantum position verification (QPV), a prover certifies her location to a set of verifiers by performing a quantum computation. One of the first QPV protocols was proposed by Kent, Munro, and Spiller in 2011: the prover receives a qubit $Q$ from one direction, receives an orthogonal basis $\{ v, v^\perp \}$ from the opposite direction, then measures $Q$ in $\{ v, v^\perp \}$ and broadcasts the result. Several variants of this protocol have been proposed and analyzed, but the question of whether the original protocol is secure has never been fully resolved. In this work we show that there is no perfect finite-dimensional cheating strategy for the single-qubit measurement protocol. Our proof uses tools from real algebraic geometry.

Abstract:In quantum position verification (QPV), a prover certifies her location to a set of verifiers by performing a quantum computation. One of the first QPV protocols was proposed by Kent, Munro, and Spiller in 2011: the prover receives a qubit $Q$ from one direction, receives an orthogonal basis $\{ v, v^\perp \}$ from the opposite direction, then measures $Q$ in $\{ v, v^\perp \}$ and broadcasts the result. Several variants of this protocol have been proposed and analyzed, but the question of whether the original protocol is secure has never been fully resolved. In this work we show that there is no perfect finite-dimensional cheating strategy for the single-qubit measurement protocol. Our proof uses tools from real algebraic geometry.

Quantum Physics (quant-ph); Algebraic Geometry (math.AG)

arXiv:2406.20022 [quant-ph]

(or arXiv:2406.20022v2 [quant-ph] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2406.20022 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

https://doi.org/10.1103/4pcn-d1yj Focus to learn more DOI(s) linking to related resources

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